IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
B E T W E E N :
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY
(hereinafter referred to as the "Company")
A N D
CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
(hereinafter referred to as the "Union")
BOARD OF ARBITRATION
G. W. Adams - Chairman
S.E. Dinsdale, Q.C.
For the Company : J.W. Healy - Counsel
R. S. Finegan
M. E. Posnikoff
For the Union : E. Lennon - Counsel
R. S. Gray
This arbitration involves the Company’s failure to pay two employees at one and one-half their regular rates of pay from 5:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. on September 1, 1975, Labour Day. The two grievors are employed as installation technicians and the parties agreed that they had been instructed to travel on that day from their residences located in Winnipeg to Sioux Lookout in Ontario. They travelled by the same motor car. The two grievors were passengers and the car was driven by Walter Rae, a general technician. The three employees left Winnipeg on September 1, 1975 at 5:00 a.m. and arrived at Sioux Lookout at 10:00 a.m. They then undertook their technician duties until 5:30 p.m. that day. September 1, 1975 was Labour Day and of course a holiday under the collective agreement. As a result, the grievors were paid at one and one-half their regular rate of pay for those hours worked from 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.; however the two grievors were paid their regular hourly rate on straight time for the time between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. spent in travelling to Sioux Lookout. On the other hand the driver was paid at one and one-half his regular rate of pay from 5:00 a.m. onward. The parties also agreed that on route to Sioux Lookout the car experienced a tire blowout and all three employees participated in the necessary repair work which consumed between one-half hour to an hour. It was further agreed that the two grievors were paid holiday pay amounting to eight hours pay at their regular rate of pay.
The relevant provisions of the collective agreement between the parties read :
Hours of Service
Clause 1 :
The hours of work, exclusive of the meal period, for all employees covered by this Agreement will be :
8 hours----for straight day duty beginning and ending between 7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. ;
7 hours----for late night duty, beginning at or later than 8:00 p.m.; and
7 1/2 hours----for all other assignments.
A work day assignment will not be split more than once, or extended beyond twelve (12) hours. Split tricks will be restricted to the absolute minimum consistent with the requirements of the service.
Overtime and Calls
Clause 2 :
Work in excess of forty (40) straight time hours in any work week shall be paid for at one and one-half times the basic straight time rate except
(a) where such work is performed by an employee due to moving from one assignment to another ;
(b) where such work is performed by an employee due to moving to or from a laid- off list ;
(c) where rest days are being accumulated ;
(d) as otherwise agreed between the General Chairman and the proper Officer of the Company.
Clause 9 :
Employees having established seniority who are selected for training will, if required to travel from their headquarters to the training location suffer no loss of wages while in transit. They will not be paid overtime for travel required outside normal working hours nor on rest days. Reasonable travel expense will be allowed. During the training period, they will be provided hotel accommodation arranged by the Company or allowed, in lieu thereof, to claim an amount equivalent to such cost for accommodation of their own choice and will be reimbursed for other reasonable expenses. If requested, they shall be advanced a reasonable amount of expense money.
Clause 1 :
An employee who qualifies in accordance with Clause 2 of this Article, shall be granted a holiday with pay on each of the following general holidays, including a general holiday falling on an employee’s rest day :
ALL PROVINCES :
New Year’s Day Labour Day
Good Friday Thanksgiving Day
Victoria Day Christmas Day
Dominion Day Boxing Day
Clause 5 (2) :
(2) An employee qualified under Clause 2 of this Article and who is required to work on a general holiday shall, at the option of the Company ;
(a) be paid, in addition to the pay provided in Sub-Clause (1) hereof, at a rate equal to one and one-half times his regular rate of wages for the actual hours worked by him on that holiday with a minimum of two (2) hours and forty (40) minutes for which two (2) hours and forty (40) minutes service may be required but an employee called for a specific purpose shall not be required to perform routine work to make up such minimum time. When more than one shift is worked by an employee on a general holiday, the provisions of this Clause (a) shall apply to the first shift only. OR
(b) be paid for work performed by him on the holiday in accordance with Article 9 with a minimum of four (4) hours at the pro rata rate for which the equivalent hours of service may be required but employees called for a specific purpose shall not be required to perform routine work to make up such minimum time and, in addition, shall be given a holiday with pay on the first calendar day on which the employee is not entitled to wages following the holiday ; pay for such holiday shall be eight (8) hours at the straight time rate of the position worked on the holiday.
Clause 6 :
Shifts or tours of duty commencing between 12:00 midnight on the eve of the general holiday and 11:59 p.m. on the night of the general holiday, both times inclusive, shall be considered as work on that holiday.
Service Away from Headquarters
Service Away from Headquarters
Clause 1 :
Employees assigned to duties (other than by bulletin or when assigned to training) away from their regular places of employment will be allowed actual reasonable expenses incurred and shall, if required be advanced a reasonable amount of expense money.
Clause 2 :
Employees will be paid at pro rata rate for time travelled outside of regularly assigned hours of duty, on order of the Company, except that compensation will not be paid for time between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and the regular starting time when sleeping accommmodation is provided. Employees must make every effort to obtain berth accommodation.
The Union relied on Wiberg and Treasury Board, (Public Service Staff Relations Board, 166-2-286), Boucher and Treasury Board, (P.S.S. R.B., 166-2-230); Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. et al v Muscoda Local No. 123 et al (1943), 135 F.R. (2d) (C.C.A. 5th) as authority for the proposition that time spent travelling on an employer’s business (in contrast to just driving to and from work in the usual sense), at the employer’s particular request : and at some inconvenience to the employee is properly characterized as "work" within the meaning of the collective agreement as well as within the meaning of Part III of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, C.L.-1 amended. It was submitted that, accordingly, no distinction should have been made between the three employees with respect to compensation in relation to the time spent in travelling from Winnipeg to Sioux Lookout. Because all three employees had "worked" from 5:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on a statutory holiday, it was submitted that all three were entitled to be paid at one and one-half times their regular rate of wages for the actual hours worked in accord with the requirements of Article 16, Clause 5(2) of the agreement. Counsel for the Union argued that Article 19, Clause 2 had no application to time spent travelling on a statutory holiday in that Article 16, Clause 5(2) is a more specific provision. Article 19, Clause 2, being the more general requirement, should therefore as a matter of construction, give way to the explicit obligation of the employer contained in Article 16, Clause 5(2). Counsel went on to suggest that this construction most likely accords with the intent of the parties in that where they have intended the more general requirements of Article 19, Clause 2 to prevail over a more specific obligation, they have specifically said so as evidenced by Article 9, Clause 2 dealing with overtime.
Counsel suggested that another indication that Article 19, Clause 2 had no application to time travelled in the course of employment, stemmed from that provision’s use of the phrase "regularly assigned hours of duty". Counsel submitted that the phrase could have no application to a statutory holiday because no employee had "regularly assigned hours of duty" on such a day.
Alternatively, counsel submitted that the Canada Labour Code, Section 54, requires an employee to be paid at a rate of pay at least equal to one and one-half times his regular rate of wages for the time worked by him on a holiday provided for by that Act. The provision in question reads :
Sec. 54. Holiday work in continuous operation employment.----An employee employed in a continuous operation who is required to work on a day on which he is entitled under this Division to a holiday with pay
(a) shall be paid, in addition to his regular rate of wages for that day, at a rate at least equal to one and one-half times his regular rate of wages for the time worked by him on that day :
The statute also provides :
Sec. 28(1). Saving more favourable benefits.----(1) This Part applies notwith- standing any other law or any custom, contract or arrangement, whether made before or after the lst day of July 1965, but nothing in this Part shall be construed as affecting any rights or benefits of an employee under any law, custom, contract or arrangement that are more favourable to him than his rights or benefits under this Part.
Sec. 47. Employed in a continunous operation. -- In this Division the expression "employed in a continuous operation" refers to employment in
(b) Any operations or services concerned with the running of trains, planes, ships, trucks and other vehicles whether in scheduled or non-scheduled operations ;
(c) any telephone, radio, television, telegraph or other communications or broadcasting operations or services ; or ..
This being so, Counsel suggested that two alternative approaches were available to the Board. First, if the Board thought Article 19, Clause 2 to be ambiguous on its face, it should have regard to the requirements of the Canada Labour Code, section 54(a) and interpret the provision in a way to avoid an illegal result. In this regard the Board was referred to a discussion of this principle of contract interpretation found in Cryovac Division, Grace Chemicals Ltd., (1972) 24 L.A.C. 127 (Weiler) at page 134. Secondly, and alternately, Counsel submitted that if the Board found Article 19, Clause 2 applied to the situation at hand, the Canada Labour Code, section 54, rendered its application unlawful and the Board was obligated to compensate the grievors in accord with the Code’s requirements. The Board was referred to United Steelworkers of America, Local 2894 et al v Galt Metal Industries Limited et al 74 CLLC 14, 220 (S.C.C.) as authority for the proposition that it is a board of arbitration’s duty to construe and apply a statute which is involved in the issues that have been brought before it.
Counsel for the Company took a decidedly different view of the matter. It was his submission that the issue before the Board was whether the period of time between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. was "work time" or "travel time" within the meaning of the collective agreement. If it was the former the grievors were entitled to compensation in accord with the requirements contained in Article 16, Clause 5(2). However if that period of time was found to be properly characterized as "travel time" for the grievors, the Article 19, Clause 2 applied and it would follow that the Company properly applied the agreement. In support of the assertion that the hours in issue were indeed "travel time" within the meaning of Article 19, Clause 2, the Board was referred to Canadian National Railway Company and Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (Weatherill, 1975 unreported), where it was held that time spent travelling as a passenger in a Company vehicle driven by another employee was properly characterized as travel time within the meaning of a provision analogous to Article 19, Clause 2.
As for the Canada Labour Code, Counsel submitted that section 54(a) had no application to time spent in travelling. He suggested that the term "work" used in that section did not include travelling time and in support of this theory he drew the Board’s attention to section 29(3) of the Code which reads :
Sec. 29(3). General holiday in week.----In a week in which a general holiday occurs that under Division IV entitles an employee to a holiday with pay in that week, the working hours of the employee in that week shall not exceed thirty-two but, for the purposes of this sub- section, in calculating the time worked by an employee in any such week, no account shall be taken of any time worked by him on the holiday or of any time during which he was at the disposal of his employer during the holiday.
It was his view that the underlined portion of the subsection demonstrated that the term "work" for the purposes of the Code, did not include time during which an employee was at the disposal of the employer but not actually working.
We have reviewed the very thoughtful submissions of the parties and have come to the conclusion that the grievances must succeed.
We start with the proposition that the term "work" includes time spent by an employee in travel to a distant location for the purpose of carrying out his or her particular function. While, generally speaking, an employee is not "at work" until he actually arrives at his office, plant or job site, we accept that time spent travelling to an unusual and distant location at the employer’s request falls within the ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "work". This view was well put in Wiberg and The Treasury Board supra, where at page 4 the adjudicator wrote :
"Generally speaking, when an employee travels to his work each day, he is not "at work" until he actually arrives at his office or plant or job site. If his residence is at some distant location, that is his own affair. Once he does arrive at the office, however, he is said to be at work even though he may not actually be performing the particular tasks appropriate to his classification. He may simply be sitting at his desk waiting for an assignment, and yet he is indeed "at work" and entitled to be paid. Likewise where, in the course of the day, he travels from one location to another for the purpose of performing his job, he is "at work" throughout that time. In the instant case, the essence of the employer’s case is that the grievor did not begin work on December 2 until he arrived in Collingwood at 7:30 a.m. that morning. The underlying assumption is that his getting to work at Collingwood that day was the grievor’s own business, just as his getting to work in Toronto on any other day was his own business. Luckily for the grievor, he was not asked to report in Vancouver or Halifax that day!
Merely to state this assumption is surely sufficient. It is obviously false. When the grievor drove to Collingwood in the early hours of December 2, and returned that evening, he was not just driving to and from work in the usual sense, he was travelling on the employer’s business, at the employer’s particular request, at some inconvenience to himself and on an assignment for which special permission had to be obtained."
This being so we are therefore satisfied that the term "work" found in Article 16, Clause 5(2) includes the time spent by the grievors travelling from Winnipeg to Sioux Lookout between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.
The Company, however, did not dispute the holding in the Wiberg case but rather relied upon the wording of Article 19, Clause 2 in support of paying the employees at pro rata rates for the time travelled. But in our view Article 19, Clause 2 does not and cannot apply to the facts at hand.
First of all we do not think that the parties intended the Article to apply to situations involving travel on a holiday. The phrase "regularly assigned hours of duty" contained in Clause 2 conveys the intention that it is only to apply to those situations when work is regularly scheduled. (See Article 9, Clause 5 for a definition of "pro rata hourly rate"). In such situations the Article implements a policy that time spent travelling should be paid for at the same rate of pay as that accorded to the regularly assigned hours of duty. Indeed this policy is confirmed by Article 9, Clause 2(a) where it is again expressly provided that such working time should not attract over-time pay. However the travel in question occurred on a statutory holiday, a day on which all work is paid for at the premium rate of one and one-half the employee’s regular rate of wages. In view of the mandatory language of Article 16, Clause 1, we do not think that work scheduled on statutory holidays can be referred to as regularly assigned hours of duty", although of course, by virtue of Article 16, Clause 5, an employee can be required to work on a general holiday. Further, it seems to us that this interpretation accords with the policy expressed in Article 19 in the sense that by applying Article 16, Clause 5 to all work performed on statutory holidays an employee will be paid at the same rate of pay for time travelling as he or she is paid for the actual performance of his or her duties on that day. In our view Article 19 adopts the policy that, because of the nature of travelling time, an employee ought not to be paid more for it than for the performance of his actual job duties. But if Article 15 was to apply to time spent travelling on a statutory holiday an employee would be paid less for time spent travelling than for the time spent in the actual performance of his job duties. In short the employee would suffer a penalty in relation to time spent travelling on a statutory holiday and one could envisage situations in which an entire holiday would be consumed by travel. If Article 19 applied in such a case the employee would receive, in effect, his regular rate of pay for the entire day. If the parties had intended this anamalous result they would have specifically dovetailed Article 19 with the application of Article 16, Clause 5 as they did in Article 9, Clause 2.
In construing the agreement in this manner we also place reliance on the provisions of the Canada Labour Code section 54(a). It is our view that the Code, at least in so far as section 54(a) is concerned, does not make a distinction between "work time" and "travel time". In other words, the Wiberg, supra, Boucher, supra, and Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co., cases are just as relevant to ascertaining the meaning of the term "work" in this section as they are to an understanding of its meaning in the collective agreement.
Admittedly section 29(3) of the Code seems to make a distinction between "time worked" and "any time during which (an employee) was at the disposal of his employer", but this is only done for the purpose of calculating the working hours of an employee in a week in which a holiday falls. Indeed, as the trade union’s counsel suggested, its use in that conjunction confirms that such hours are properly characterized as work in a general sense or there would have been no need to subtract those hours from the calculation required by section 29(3).
Our second, and alternative, reason for upholding the grievances is based on the view that if Article 19, Clause 2 deprives the grievors of payment at one and one-half their regular rates of pay, the provision must be considered null and void. If the provision means what the Company says, it means, it is in direct conflict with section 54(a) and section 28 of the Code which expressly provides that all the provisions in Part III apply notwithstanding "any other law or any custom, contract or arrangement----".
There is ample authority for the application by arbitrators of general laws external to the collective agreement to strike down offending provisions of the contract. As Denning, L.J. said in David Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barnet (1953), l All E.R. 843 (C.A.) : "There is not one law for arbitrators and another for the court, but one law for all. If a contract is illegal, arbitrators must decline to award on it, just as the court would do". The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in United Steelworkers of America, Local 2894 et al v. Galt Metal Industries Limited et al 74 CLLC 14,220. In that case employees had refused to work assigned overtime and relied upon a provision of the Ontario Employment Standards Act, S.O. 1974, c.112, as amended, providing that an employee could not be required to work beyond the statutory limitation of forty-eight hours per week without his consent or that of his agent. In interpreting the provisions of the agreement as containing such consent the Court he the arbitrator had varied the agreement. In specifically dealing with the duty of a board of arbitration to "apply" relevant public law, the Chief Justice expressed himself in the following manner :
"I agree with my brother Martland in his disposition of this appeal, but I wish to add for myself why I cannot accept the approach taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal, namely, that there was an issue of construction and the construction adopted by the arbitrator was one which the language which he had to construe would reasonably bear. Although the issue before the arbitrator arose by virtue of a grievance under a collective agreement it became necessary for him to go outside the collective agreement and to construe and apply a statute which was not a projection of the collective bargaining relations of the parties but a general public enactment of the superior provincial Legislature. On such manner, there
can be no policy of curial deference to the adjudication of an arbitrator, chosen by the parties or in accordance with their prescriptions, who interprets a document which is in language to which they have subscribed as a domestic charter to govern their relationship.
Insofar as Re Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. and International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, (1972) 1 O.R. 36 71 CLLC 14,008 would apply the same test to the construction of a statute called for in a grievance arbitration as to the construction of the collective agreement itself under which the grievance arises, I would hold it to be wrong. No doubt, a statute like a collective agreement or any other document may present difficulties of construction, may be ambiguous and may lend itself to two different constructions, neither of which may be thought to be unreasonable. If that be the case, it nonetheless lies with the Court and ultimately with this Court, to determine what meaning the statute should bear. That is not to say that an arbitrator in the course of his duty, should refrain from construing a statute which is involved in the issues that have been brought before him. In my opinion he must construe, but at the risk of having his construction set aside by a Court as being wrong.
I would allow the appeal and make the same award as to costs as proposed by my brother Martland".
However, in the Galt Metal Industries Limited case, the requirements of the statute could be satisfied by merely striking down any offending provision or at least by striking down any discipline imposed on employees protected by the statute, whereas, in the facts at hand, it might be said that the Board is enforcing a positive obligation located in the statute, i.e., requiring the company to pay one and one-half the employees’regular rates of pay for the hours in question. In our view, the cases are not distinguishable on this ground. In the facts at hand we have held that to the extent Article 19 interferes with the claim of an employee under Article 16, Article 19 is null and void. In effect, then, any positive obligation of the employer arises from the agreement and not the statute, i.e., Article 16.
For all of these reasons the grievances succeed. The employer is directed to pay the grievors at one and one-half times their regular rate of wages for the time spent travelling on September 1, 1975 between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.
DATED AT TORONTO THIS DAY OF A.D. 1978
_______________________ S.E. Dinsdale, Q.C.
________________________ W. Walsh
G. W. Adams, Chairman
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
B E T W E E N :
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY
A N D
CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
D I S S E N T
I have received the award of the Chairman and have considered it carefully but cannot agree that the grievance should succeed.
The facts as set out in the majority award are not in dispute and in essence involved a claim for a premium payment of time and one-half for time spent travelling on a statutory holiday. The Company contended that the grievors were properly paid under the provisions of Article 19, Clause 2.
Service Away from Headquarters
Clause 2 :
Employees will be paid at pro rata rate for time travelled outside of regularly
assigned hours of duty, on order of the Company, except that compensation will not be paid for time between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and the regular starting time when sleeping accommodation is provided. Employees must make every effort to obtain berth accommodation.
The Union on the other hand maintained that Article 19, Clause 2 did not apply in cases of statutory holidays and that the grievors should be paid under the provisions of Article 16, Clause 5(2). Union Counsel referred the Board to a number of cases standing for the proposition that time spent travelling at the employer’s request is time spent working.
With respect, I feel that the application of that principle must be read subject to the provisions of the Collective Agreement. In this case, the parties have, in Article 19 Clause 2, expressly addressed themselves to the issue. The relevant portion states that "Employees will be paid at pro rata rate for time travelled outside of regularly assigned hours of duty, on order of the Company". Nowhere on the face of it are statutory holidays excluded from Article 19, Clause 2. The Union argued that the Clause had no application to a statutory holiday because of the phrase "outside regularly assigned hours of duty" which it submitted indicated that the Clause did not contemplate travel on a statutory holiday. On my reading of the phrase, I am unable to find any ground for such a distinction. To my mind, the phrase suggests that Article 19, Clause 2 was precisely intended to apply in instances such as the present, where the time spent travelling was clearly "outside of regularly assigned hours of duty". In other words, Article 19, Clause 2 provides a method of payment for time spent travelling when such time is not part of a regular working day.
This very point seems to have been considered in an earlier case involving the Canadian National Railway Company and the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (Weatherill 1975 unreported).
In that case, the grievor travelled on his day of rest and was paid at his straight time rate for the time involved. The grievance claimed he should have been paid at the rate of time and one-half. The Board noted that there were a number of provisions which specifically dealt with the matter of payment for travel time. The portion of the article which the Board found applied in that case is virtually identical to the travel time clause before this Board. The provision in question was the third paragraph from Article 24(a) :
"When gang employees are assigned away from their outfit cars, on orders of the Company, they will be paid at pro rata rates for time travelled outside of regularly assigned hours . . . ."
The Board noted that "all of the time - some ten hours - was outside the grievor’s normal hours of work" and went on to find that Article 24(a) applied and since the grievor was paid in accordance with those provisions, the grievance was dismissed.
I can see no material distinction between that decision and the case before this Board. Whether the travel time occurred on an employee’s day of rest or on a statutory holiday, the fact remains that in both instances, the time spent was "outside of regularly assigned hours of duty". I would therefore find that Article 19, Clause 2 applied in the present case and that there has been no violation of the Collective Agreement.
In coming to this conclusion, I am not unmindful that there are occasions when although an employee is in the act of travelling, he may be considered to be "at work" for the purposes of the Collective Agreement. In this respect, I am in complete agreement with the Weatherill decision referred to above in which it was noted that :
"This Company has paid employees at the premium rate where the conditions of travel time have been such as to make it appropriate to consider travel time as time "at work" in the fullest sense".
The Board illustrated by reference to the example where employees travel in the back of an open truck. In a slightly different fashion, the Board indicated that if while en route the employee carried out the duties of his classification as happened in Boucher and Treasury Board, he would be considered to be "at work". I find that neither of these two conditions were present in the instant case where the two employees in question travelled by passenger car.
Before concluding, I would like to make reference to the argument that the Canada Labour Code takes precedence over Article 19, Clause 2 of the Collective Agreement. I agree with the majority that the effect of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Galt Metal Industries is that the board must, in interpreting the provisions of the Collective Agreement, construe and apply any relevant statutory provisions.
In this case, Counsel for the Union argued that Section 54 of the Canada Labour Code applied and required a payment at the rate of time and one-half. For the sake of convenience, I have set out the provision in question.
Sec. 54 Holiday work in continuous operation employment. - An employee employed in a continuous operation who is required to work on a day on which he is entitled under this Division to a holiday with pay :
(a) shall be paid, in addition to his regular rate of wages for that day, at a rate at least equal to one and one-half times his regular rate of wages for the time worked by him on that day.
To my mind, the relevant portion of clause (a) is that time and one-half shall be paid "for the time worked". I am unable to agree that this phrase includes time spent travelling. I am assisted in coming to this conclusion by Section 29(3) of the Code which reads as follows :
Canada Labour Code - Sec. 29(3) General holiday in week - In a week in which a general holiday occurs that under Division IV entitles an employee to a holiday with pay in that week, the working hours of the employee in that week shall not exceed thirty-two ; but, for the purposes of this subsection, in calculating the time worked by an employee in any such week, no account shall be taken during which he was at the disposal of his employer during the holiday.
The key to Section 29(3) is of course that it provides that time during which an employee was at the disposal of his employer shall not be counted for purposes of calculating the time worked in the week in which a statutory holiday occurs. In my view, the phrase "at the disposal of his employer" is broad enough to include travel time and accordingly I would have construed Section 29(3) as standing for the proposition that travel time shall not be counted as time worked for the purposes of Section 29(3). That being the case, I find it difficult to accept that for purposes of Section 54 time worked includes travel time, particularly in view of the fact that Section 54, like Section 29(3), involves a public holiday.
As indicated above, I would deal with this matter on the basis that the parties have specifically addressed themselves to the payment of travel time in the Collective Agreement. I find nothing to indicate that Article 19, Clause 2 has no application to statutory holidays and since payment was made in accordance with that provision, I would dismiss the grievance.
Dated at Toronto this 23rd day of December, 1977.