The position which the Company tabled during negotiations under the

letter of understanding, and which it brings to this arbitration, is

found in four documents delivered to the Union on November 4, 1989.

The first document proposes a formula for accelerated true attrition

through the establishment of voluntary separation opportunities, the

elements of which are as follows:

1. All non-essential brakeman's positions not filled as of the

effective date of the Memorandum consequent upon no

applications being received from protected employees i.e.,

positions currently the application of the existing freight

crew consist provisions) would be declared permanently

discontinued. Thereafter, such permanently discontinued

position|s could only be filled to avoid the lay off of a

protected employee at his or her home station.

2. A lump sum payment of $60,000 for protected freight employees

who are eligible for early retirement and who voluntarily

elect to do so. Group life insurance and extended health

care benefits would be maintained until age 65 with premiums

fully paid by the Company. At age 65, the employee would be

entitled to a paid up life insurance policy equivalent to

that provided under the terms of the collective agreement in

effect at that time.

3. A voluntary deferred separation plan for protected employees

who are at least 50 years of age and within f eligibility for

early retirement under the pension rules. Employees

voluntarily deferred separation would be entitled to bi-

weekly payments of 65% of their basic weekly salary of

leaving active service until eligible for early retirement.

In addition, they would be entitled to a lump sum payment

equivalent to 30 to 40 weeks' salary dependent upon length of

service. Group life insurance and extended health care

benefits would be maintained until age 65 with premiums fully

paid by the Company. At age 65, the employee would be

entitled to a paid up life insurance policy equivalent to

that provided under the terms of the collective agreement in

effect at that time.

4. A lump sum severance payment of $50,000 for protected

employees who are not eligible for early retirement or the

deferred separation plan but who voluntarily elect to sever

their employment relationship


5. A lump sum payment of $25,000 for protected freight employees

who elect to voluntarily forfeit their protected status.

6. The various separation opportunities would be made available

at each terminal, on a one time basis only, but the total

number of such opportunities would be limited to the number

of occupied non-essential rear-end brakeman's positions at

the particular terminal. They would be distributed, on the

basis of seniority, with preference given first to employees

eligible for early retirement, next to employees eligible for

the deferred separation plan and, thereafter, to employees

electing to sever or to forfeit their protected status in

that order.

7. For each such opportunity taken by a protected freight

employee, a non-essential brakeman's position would be

permanently discontinued. Thereafter, such permanently

discontinued positions would only be filled to avoid the lay

off of a protected employee at that location.


The second document tabled by the Company was a draft Letter of

Understanding, the terms of which would allow the Company to

distribute any separation opportunities unused after the exhaustion

of the process of voluntary separation described in its first

proposal, among members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.

In the result, as a locomotive engineer leaves the Company's

workforce to be replaced by a permanently promoted trainman with

protected status, a further non-essential brakeman's position would

be permanently discontinued. Again, that position would be available

to be filled only to avoid the layoff of a protected employee at the

location in question.

The third document tabled concerned the introduction of a seniority

rule analogous to that operating on CP Rail, the effect of which

would be to further accelerate the use of reduced crews. The

Company's proposal (referred to hereinafter as "the CP Rule") was

worded as follows:

A trainman whose seniority entitles him or her to a

conductor's position or a temporary vacancy of six day's or

more or a temporary vacancy known to be of six consecutive

days or more shall not be permitted to fill a brakeman's

position if, as a result thereof, the Company would be

deprived of reducing a "reducible crew" in road freight

service. In these circumstances, the junior It protected"

conductor not holding a conductor's position or temporary

vacancy, as the case may be, will be required to fill a

conductor's position or temporary vacancy.

A fourth and final document tabled by the Company consisted of a

proposed Letter of Understanding designed to protect present

employees falling under collective agreements 4.16 and 4.3 in the

event of any further reduction in crew size beyond the limits of the

existing Reduced Freight Crew Agreement.

As is evident from the foregoing, the centerpiece of the Company's

proposal is the utilization of voluntary separation opportunities as

a means of achieving true attrition to accelerate the use of reduced

crew consists. The separation opportunities would be offered on a

terminal-by-terminal basis being equal in number to the number of

crews operating out of that terminal on a full-crew basis. In other

words, for example, where 15 of 20 freight crews running out of a

hypothetical terminal operate with full crews rather than reduced

crews, fifteen separation opportunities would be made available to

protected employees who are home-stationed at that terminal. In

the aggregate, according to the Company's calculations, a total of

approximately 580 separation opportunities would be made available

across its system nationally. The separation opportunities would

take three forms: early retirement opportunities, deferred

separation opportunities and severance or resignation opportunities,

all to be distributed in that order among protected employees on a

seniority basis. If protected employees entitled to early retirement

do not utilize all of the opportunities available at a terminal,

those entitled to deferred separation would have the next

opportunity, followed by protected employees willing to elect

severance, until the quota of available opportunities at the terminal

is exhausted. For the purposes of clarity, trainmen entitled to

early retirement opportunities are protected employees who are 55

years of age and have accumulated 85 points under the Company's

pension rules, whereby one point is given for each year of age and

each year of cumulative compensated service. As of March 1, 1990

employees in that category are entitled to retire on full pension,

without any actuarial reduction. The lump sum payment of $60,000

proposed by the Company would then be payable to that individual,

over and above his or her normal pension. Additionally, the employee

electing early retirement would be entitled to the proposed insurance

and benefit protections to the normal retirement age, and receive a

fully paid-up life insurance policy at age 65.

Under the Company's proposal certain protected employees not eligible

for early retirement would have eligibility for deferred separation

opportunities. This category would be limited to employees who are

at least 50 years of age and are within five years of eligibility for

retirement under the Company's pension rules. It cites an example of

an employee who is 50 years old and has 25 years of cumulative

compensated service. That person would be eligible for early

retirement in five years under existing rules and would, under the

Company's proposal, be eligible for a deferred separation

opportunity, whenever such an opportunity might remain available at a

given terminal after the exhaustion of the early retirement elections

of the protected employees. The protected employee voluntarily

electing a deferred separation would receive compensation calculated

on 65 percent of his or her basic weekly pay until the time that the

employee becomes eligible for early retirement, with payments to be

made on a bi-weekly basis. For road service employees this is to be

calculated on the basis of 1/52 of total earnings over the previous

26 bi-weekly pay periods. Yard service employees are to be

calculated on the basis of five days' straight time pay. Employees

treated under this provision would be required to retire when they

reach eligibility for early retirement. They would then be entitled

to a lump sum payment equating to between 30 and 40 times their basic

weekly pay. Twenty-five years of cumulative compensated service or

less would entitle the employee to 30 times the amount of basic

weekly pay, with the multiplier being increased by one up to a

maximum of 40 for each additional year of service over 25.

By way of example, the Company cites the employee who has accumulated

35 years of service. He or she would be entitled to a lump sum

payment calculated at 40 times the basic weekly pay of $1,031.11

yielding $41,244. If that employee is two and a half years from

eligibility for early retirement the total monetary value of the

Company's proposal is assessed at $128,000. It estimates that the

combination of bi- weekly payments and the lump sum payment at

retirement give to that employee the equivalent of 85 percent of

basic weekly pay over the preretirement period, assuming no lump sum

payment is made at retirement. Additionally, protected employees

electing deferred separation remain entitled to group life and

extended health care benefits up to age 65 and the receipt of a

paid-up life insurance policy at that age. In justification of this

offer, the Company notes that it was applied with the agreement of

all unions affected in 1988 upon the closure of the Company's rail

operations in Newfoundland, as well as to an agreed arrangement with

the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees in respect of a major

reorganization of track forces which involved the elimination of over

1,500 positions.

The third category of voluntary separation contemplated in the

Company's proposal is aimed at persons not eligible for early

retirement or who are not within five years of eligibility to

retire. Protected employees in that category who elect to avail

themselves of an unused separation opportunity at a given terminal

would be simply entitled to a $50,000 lump sum payment upon voluntary

resignation. Severance of employment in that circumstance would

involve no further health or insurance benefits.

Lastly, as a means of further accelerating the reduction of crews,

the Company offers a lump sum payment of $25,000 to any protected

employee not eligible for the first two options, and not electing the

third option, as a means of forfeiting his or her protected status.

In other words, where there is an unused separation opportunity in a

given terminal, the protected employee at that location who is not

eligible for early retirement or a deferred separation, and who does

not elect resignation, may surrender his or her protected employee

status in exchange for a lump sum payment of $25,000. He or she then

remains on the active workforce with no further right to claim non-

essential brakemen's assignments.

A cornerstone aspect of the proposal so advanced by the Company is

that for each voluntary surrender of a protected position a

non-essential position in a reducible crew is to be permanently

discontinued. In other words, at the terminals affected, non-

essential positions so eliminated would not be rebulletined at the

next change of timetable and would no longer be available to

protected employees who remain active, save in the circumstance where

a protected employee would otherwise be unable to hold any work at

the home station. To ensure the clear implementation of these

attrition rules, the Company would require that a process whereby all

non-essential positions discontinued pursuant to the rules are to be

so identified and to be declared permanently discontinued.

T|hereafter the discontinuation of further non-essential positions by

the election of protected employees to accept separation

opportunities or forfeit their protected status would apply only to

the remaining non-essential position. The Company's concern is to

minimize the revival of non-essential positions available to

protected employees at the change in timetable. According to its

proposal, therefore, effective October 29, 1989 where no applications

for protected employees were made in respect of non-essential

positions, such positions are to be declared permanently

discontinued, only to be filled in situations where protected

employees would otherwise be unable to hold work at their home


An essential element of the Company's proposal is the determination

of a time limit during which separation opportunities and forfeitures

of protected status may be elected by eligible employees. In this

regard it proposes a period of 90 days immediately following the

effective date of the Arbitrator's Award. It submits that the 90

days is a sufficient time to permit employees to obtain such

information as they may require in respect of pension entitlements,

and to give them the needed time to reflect on the pros and cons of

their decision.

The second document tabled by the Company proposes offering unused

separation opportunities to enginemen, represented by the Brotherhood

of Locomotive Engineers. Almost without exception employees in that

classification originally progressed through the ranks of the

trainmen's union. Trainmen are entitled to qualify as locomotive

engineers and gain standing on the locomotive engineer's seniority

list. While, generally speaking, they cannot then hold permanent

work as a locomotive engineer, over time, while working principally

as a trainman or yardman, and occasionally as a locomotive engineer

on a replacement basis, they accrue seniority which eventually allows

them to hold permanent work as an engineman, at which point they are

permanently promoted to the status of locomotive engineer. The

Company's proposal is intended to use the departure of protected

trainmen who are promoted to the rank of permanent locomotive

engineer as a further means of attrition in the reduction of

non-essential trainmen's positions.

The Company notes that this concept of attrition was accepted by the

Union in the agreement governing the reduction in the consist of yard

crews. Under that agreement, one non-essential position of yard

helper was discontinued for each protected employee promoted to a

locomotive engineer's position. It submits that the same principle

should operate in respect of the reduction of non-essential

brakeman's positions in freight crew consists. According to the

terms of the -Company's proposal, it could enter into an agreement

with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers whereby separation

opportunities initially identified as available to trainmen which

went unused, could thereafter be made available to locomotive

engineers, on condition that the separation of the locomotive

engineer would trigger the promotion of a protected employee to the

locomotive engineers' working list. The promotion of the protected

employee out of the ranks of the trainmen's bargaining unit would

then result in the permanent discontinuance of a non-essential

position at the terminal in question, in the same manner as is

described above, subject always to its availability to protected

trainmen remaining in service who would otherwise be unable to hold

work at that home terminal.

The third document tabled by the Company concerns the acceleration of

attrition by rules governing the ability of protected employees to

elect to fill non-essential |brakemen's positions in circumstances

where they have sufficient seniority to hold a conductor's position.

The Company's concern is that under the present rules a protected

employee can elect to fill a non-essential rear end brakeman's

position, thereby waiving the opportunity to hold a conductor's

position. This occasionally results in a crew being composed of a

non-protected employee occupying the conductor's position while a

non-essential rear end brakeman is required to be assigned because

that position has been elected by a protected employee with greater

seniority. The Company submits that that result runs counter to the

underlying purpose of the Reduced Freight Crew Agreement. It

therefore proposes that in circumstances when a non-protected

employee would be the successful applicant to a conductor's position

advertised pursuant to the provisions which require the posting of

permanent or temporary vacancies, the junior protected employee who

would otherwise occupy a non-essential position, will be required to

fill the conductor's position. By way of precedent for this

arrangement the Company points to the existing provisions of the

collective agreements which compel a junior qualified conductor to

fill a posted conductor's position when there are no voluntary

applicants for it.

The Company's fourth and final proposal consists of a document

clarifying the work entitlements of non-protected employees who are

employed as of the date of the Memorandum of Settlement of August 29,

1989, and employees hired after that date. It guarantees protected

status to non-protected employees who were working on that date in

respect of all positions to which they are presently entitled to

work. In other words, non-protected employees on the payroll, as of

August 29, 1989, gain protected status in the event of any future

reduction of crews beyond the size of crew consist in freight service

established in the existing Reduced Freight Crew Agreement.

The Company cites a number of further arguments in general support of

its overall proposal. It underscores, of course, the voluntary

nature of the election of separation opportunities which is at the

heart of its proposal to attain true attrition. No protected

employees forfeit their employment, or their protected status, unless

they freely elect to do so. The choice to so elect is not coerced,

but is made attractive by what the Company characterizes as generous

retirement and severance incentives. It argues that in fact no

employee remaining in the work force, whether protected or non-

protected, will suffer adversely by the operation of its proposal,

and that specifically no employee will lose work as a result of it.

In the Company's view the likely outcome of the implementation of its

proposal is that non-essential positions on less desirable

assignments will in all likelihood be discontinued and be no longer

available to protected employees, save where they would otherwise

be laid off. However, the loss of the opportunity to to a less

desirable job assignment is a disadvantage that is more theoretical

than real. The Employer further suggests that in fact the taking up

of early retirement and deferred separation opportunities will result

in the vacating of assignments by relatively senior employees,

resulting in the greater availability of more desirable jobs for

junior protected employees. Moreover, to the extent that the Union

argues that the reduction of non-essential positions will adversely

impact on the work opportunities of protected spare board employees,

the Company cites its proposal, whereby there is provision to

increase the number of available separation opportunities at

locations where there are protected employees on the spare board, up

to a maximum of 25 percent. To the suggestion of the Union that a

reduction in the number of non-essential positions will make

non-protected employees more vulnerable to layoff as they may be

displaced from essential positions, the Company submits that that is

the natural consequence of non- protected status, as in any system

where layoff is to be implemented on the basis of seniority. In the

Employer's view the establishment of the two classes of protected

employees was never intended as a form of job security for

non-protected bargaining unit members. That, it submits, is

inherent in the original Reduced Freight Crew Agreements.



Not surprisingly, the position of the Union before the Arbitrator is

in substantial disagreement with the Company's proposal. It submits

that the present freight crew consist rule provides a sufficient

formula for gradual reducibility, and should not be amended. In its

view the existing rule meets the needs of the Company to eventually

achieve full reducibility through attrition while, at the same time,

protecting the job security and seniority rights of its membership.

Its representatives argue that any tampering with a previously agreed

attrition formula may have a serious impact on labour relations

generally, resulting in an erosion of mutual trust.

The Union invokes the history of attrition as a concept to deal with

reductions in the face of non-essential positions within the railway

industry. It cites the history of the protections accorded to

locomotive firemen on both CP Rail and CN following the Kellock Royal

Commission Report of the 1950s. Additionally, it refers to the

implementation of the run-throughs dealt with by the Freedman

Industrial Inquiry which endorsed the concept of the sharing of cost

savings among impacted employees. It further points to the

principles underlying the agreements reached in the 1960s at both CN

and CP for the reduction of yard crew consists and the agreement made

in 1968 which paved the way for reduced passenger crew consists, with

rights to certain positions in passenger service. It notes in

particular that revisions to the passenger crew consist agreement

made in a recent round of bargaining with VIA Rail, resulting in

accelerated reducibility, comprised advantages to employees including

a share in productivity gains, increased wages for reduced crew

members and certain maintenance of earnings provisions.

The Union also draws to the Arbitrator's attention the content of

certain short-line crew consist reduction agreements which have been

implemented in Canada. It cites recent examples of agreements

governing crew reductions on B.C. Rail and the Algoma Central

Railway, noting that the Algoma Central Agreement includes a premium

pay for reduced crew members. Similarly, an agreement negotiated

between the Union and the Essex Terminal Railway provides reduced

crew members a premium of $10.56 for each shift. These examples are

advanced by the Union in support of its argument that the concept of

a share in productivity savings is an important feature in agreements

of this kind, along with attrition rules which touch upon job

security and protection dates. It notes that the most recent

agreements, including Algoma Central and Essex Terminal, incorporate

a form of share in productivity savings through the payment of

"Lonesome Pay", a concept with precedent in the Reduced Freight Crew

Agreements negotiated by the Union in railways in the United States,

as well as with VIA Rail.

The Union further challenges the Company's arguments based on

competitive productivity, in particular as regards its position

relative to CP Rail. It submits that a truer productivity reading is

to be gained from figures respecting the ratio of tonne kilometers

hauled per employee (employee meaning conductors and brakeman) in a

given year. It cites, for example, that in 1966 CP Rail had 2,573

conductors and brakemen in freight service who hauled 177 billion

gross tonne kilometers, for an average of 68.79 million gross tonne

kilometers per employee. In comparison, CN in the same year utilized

3,253 brakemen to handle 245 gross tonne kilometers, or 75.32 million

gross tonne kilometers per employee. To further question the

Company's premises with respect to productivity, it draws to the

Arbitrator's attention the fact that in the same year, according to

Statistics Canada figures, the average number of cars on CP trains

was 71.1 while on CN it was 77.3, with CN cars being 8.7% longer than

those of CP Rail. The Union's representatives argue that longer

trains mean fewer trains operating, which may to some extent explain

why CN has fewer reduced crew starts than its major competitor.

In general terms, the Union views the Company's proposal as designed

to achieve significant long-term savings to the railway in a mariner

that is not commensurate with the impact on seniority rights,

quality of work, job opportunities and overall earnings. which may

be brought to bear on its members. The first position of the Union

as noted above is that the existing rules governing the utilization

of reduced crews should not be altered. It argues that these

provisions were agreed to in good faith in 1978, and subsequently in

1982, and should not now be revised in a way that differs from the

expectation of employees in the bargaining unit.

The Union argues that a number of factors, some of which are within

the control of management, have influenced the reducibility of crews.

Already mentioned is the use of longer trains: as fewer trains are

operated, fewer employees are needed and more protected employees

remain available to fill non-essential brakemen's assignments.

Further, the Union cites declines in business suffered by the

railways, particularly in the reduction of bulk commodity traffic in

1988 and 1989. To the extent that this too resulted in fewer freight

trains being run, the bidding into non-essential positions by

protected employees became more frequent.

The Union also argues the impact of a number of technological and

operational changes that have been introduced at various terminals

across Canada, resulting in an overall reduction in work

opportunities in both road and yard service. In this regard it

points to some 100 jobs lost as a result of technological and

operational changes in Western Canada alone, and refers generally to

similar impacts in Eastern and Central Canada, including the closing

of the Newfoundland Railway and terminal closures within the Great

Lakes Region. The Union also reminds the Arbitrator of the effect of

recent substantial cutbacks in employment opportunities at VIA

Rail. Reciprocal agreements affecting CN, VIA Rail and the UTU

allowed certain UTU members to return to service with CN from VIA

Rail. In doing so they displaced junior employees from positions at

CN. In the Union's submissions, but for the job security aspects of

the freight crew consists rules, its membership within CN would have

suffered greatly as a result of the VIA Rail cutbacks.

The Union also notes the displacement impact of abolishments of

yardmaster and engineer positions within CN's system generally.

As such employees exercise their acquired seniority rights to return

to trainmen's positions, they displace into the bargaining unit,

impacting negatively on the job security of existing members. To the

extent that non-essential positions are absolutely reduced, the

Union submits that such "bumping back" into the bargaining unit by

yardmen and locomotive engineers will have still greater adverse

impact on job security.

The Union further questions the legitimacy of the Company's proposal

in light of what it terms under-utilization of reduced crews under

existing rules. In particular, it points to the fact that the

Company frequently opts to operate with a full crew, rather than with

a reduced crew, because the rules permit a full crew to work eleven

hours before becoming eligible to book rest, while reduced

crews may take rest after a shorter tour of ten hours on duty.

Additionally, the Union argues that by allowing locomotive engineers

to earn mileage beyond the maximum contemplated in the regulations,

the Company knowingly reduces the frequency of opportunities for

trainmen qualified as engineers to work in that capacity, thereby

promoting the greater likelihood of protected trainmen being

compelled to fill reducible positions. |The Union further raises the

effect of what it characterizes as underlying restrictive policies of

the Company with respect to leaves and time off. It argues that to

the extent that the Company has limited the opportunities to take

voluntary leaves, without pay, or in some instances leaves to to

temporary vacancies at VIA Rail, it has indirectly contributed to

protected employees being available to bid onto non-essential

positions. It cites the similar effect of a restrictive policy of

the Company with respect to the computation of trainmen's vacation


The Union does not oppose all aspects of the Company's proposals.

Specifically, it has no objection to the Company having the right to

offer more ear|iv retirement opportunities to its members on a

voluntary basis. It submits that that measure, combined with an

adjustment in management policies in the areas reviewed above would,

standing alone, achieve an acceleration in the reduction of

non-essential brakemen's positions.

The alternative position of the Union is that if there is to be

modification of the reduced freight crew agreement, any changes

should ensure that four conditions are included:

1. Job security protection.

2. Retirement opportunities.

3. Share of the productivity savings.

4. Work rule improvements.

By job security protection the Union means provisions whereby the

employees are guaranteed that there will be no loss of earnings as a

result of a modification of the reduced freight crew consist

agreement. Specifically, it maintains that reducible positions in

freight service should remain accessible in the event of any further

impacts on the workforce such as external events like VIA Rail

reductions, terminal closures, pool car or crew reductions and the

like. Additionally, in the Union's view, the existing number of

positions in road service should remain available to employees in

yard service who may be negatively impacted by job reductions. The

Union also proposes that provision be made for ensuring that

reducible positions are given to employees whose capacity to work is

reduced due to illness or injury.

While the fundamental position of the Union is that any modification

of the rule should result in no employee being laid off, it tables an

alternative. It maintains that in the event that an unprotected

employee is laid off as a result of changes in the Reduced Freight

Crew Agreement, wage protection must be provided to the laid-off

employee. It would calculate wage protection based upon 80 percent

of an employee's previous year's earnings. Additionally, in the case

of employees who are not laid off but whose work opportunities are

reduced, the Union proposes an earnings protection formula, based

upon the previous 52 weeks' earnings, or a guarantee of 3,800 miles

per month, whichever is greater. Further the Union seeks the

establishment of a new employee protection date. It would apply to

all employees, guaranteeing their entitlement to work in freight

service, as a conductor or trainman, until retirement, resignation

or any other means of separation from service.

The Union submits that any retirement opportunities made available

should be generous in number. It proposes that the average number of

reducible positions be calculated on each district, with credits for

spare board relief. It notes that in the previous reduced freight

crew agreements a factor of 25 percent of the number of reducible

positions has been included as representing the spare board. In the

Union's view 33.3 percent would be a more realistic factor.

With respect to the amount of the retirement separation allowance,

the Union proposes that it should be no less than $80,000 per

employee, with unused retirement opportunities to be carried forward

until all are used. It also proposes terms that would allow the lump

sum payments to be taken, at the option of the employee, for a period

of up to 12 months in two installments.

Following the precedent of the Newfoundland Railway Closure

Agreement, the Union further proposes a bridging provision. It would

be available to any employees fifty years of age or older to the date

that they are eligible for retirement under the CN pension rules, and

the separation allowance, at 80 percent of their wages. Under the

terms of the Union's position employees taking early retirement under

this modified rule would maintain dental, extended health care and

life insurance coverage.


As noted above, a share in the productivity savings to be realized

through changes in the reduced crew rules is proposed by the Union.

It maintains that the rates of pay for conductors be increased to

equal the locomotive engineers' rates, and that the brakeman's rate

be upgraded to the equivalent of conductor's rates. This, it

submits, would produce an equitable share of the productivity

savings, directed to the employees who are compelled to work in

reduced freight crew service. The Union further demands a reduction

of the maximum mileage limitations established for pay purposes, and

for yard service employees the reduction of the basic day from eight

hours to six hours per shift. It also proposes a more generous

formula of graduated vacation benefits.

Following the presentation of its position at the hearings, the Union

offered rebuttal to the positions and arguments of the Company.

While it made a number of submissions in that regard, as several

of them overlap the thrust of its submission in chief, they need not

be reviewed here in detail. Two of the arguments presented by the

Union rebuttal, however, raised issues of substance which caused the

Arbitrator to seek further clarification from the Company. The

first position advanced by the Union is that the permanent

elimination of reducible positions will result in a reduction in road

service work opportunities, which in turn will have a displacement

impact. By referring to examples at the three terminals of

Garneau, Biggar and Sarnia, the Union's representatives tabled

scenarios in which they maintain the reduction in road service

opportunities will force employees to move onto the spare board and

ultimately displace others, causing layoffs among unprotected

employees. Secondly, the Union submits that adopting the "CP Rule",

whereby protected trainmen with the seniority to claim conductor's

work must do so if their filling a brakeman's position would deprive

the Company operating with a reducible crew in freight service would

result in employees being laid off. By examining the fact scenario

which it maintains exists at Hornepayne, the Union argues that the

operation of that rule can cause a ripple effect, the result of which

will be the layoff of trainmen. Additionally, by examining the

potential impact of the Company's proposals at Capreol, the Union

maintains that the predictability and regularity of

assignments will be disrupted, impacting negatively on the quality of

working life of the employees concerned.