©b45rIV. COMPANY PROPOSALS
The position which the Company tabled during negotiations under the
letter of understanding, and which it brings to this arbitration, is
found in four documents delivered to the Union on November 4, 1989.
The first document proposes a formula for accelerated true attrition
through the establishment of voluntary separation opportunities, the
elements of which are as follows:
1. All non-essential brakeman's positions not filled as of the
effective date of the Memorandum consequent upon no
applications being received from protected employees i.e.,
positions currently the application of the existing freight
crew consist provisions) would be declared permanently
discontinued. Thereafter, such permanently discontinued
position|s could only be filled to avoid the lay off of a
protected employee at his or her home station.
2. A lump sum payment of $60,000 for protected freight employees
who are eligible for early retirement and who voluntarily
elect to do so. Group life insurance and extended health
care benefits would be maintained until age 65 with premiums
fully paid by the Company. At age 65, the employee would be
entitled to a paid up life insurance policy equivalent to
that provided under the terms of the collective agreement in
effect at that time.
3. A voluntary deferred separation plan for protected employees
who are at least 50 years of age and within f eligibility for
early retirement under the pension rules. Employees
voluntarily deferred separation would be entitled to bi-
weekly payments of 65% of their basic weekly salary of
leaving active service until eligible for early retirement.
In addition, they would be entitled to a lump sum payment
equivalent to 30 to 40 weeks' salary dependent upon length of
service. Group life insurance and extended health care
benefits would be maintained until age 65 with premiums fully
paid by the Company. At age 65, the employee would be
entitled to a paid up life insurance policy equivalent to
that provided under the terms of the collective agreement in
effect at that time.
4. A lump sum severance payment of $50,000 for protected
employees who are not eligible for early retirement or the
deferred separation plan but who voluntarily elect to sever
their employment relationship
5. A lump sum payment of $25,000 for protected freight employees
who elect to voluntarily forfeit their protected status.
6. The various separation opportunities would be made available
at each terminal, on a one time basis only, but the total
number of such opportunities would be limited to the number
of occupied non-essential rear-end brakeman's positions at
the particular terminal. They would be distributed, on the
basis of seniority, with preference given first to employees
eligible for early retirement, next to employees eligible for
the deferred separation plan and, thereafter, to employees
electing to sever or to forfeit their protected status in
that order.
7. For each such opportunity taken by a protected freight
employee, a non-essential brakeman's position would be
permanently discontinued. Thereafter, such permanently
discontinued positions would only be filled to avoid the lay
off of a protected employee at that location.
The second document tabled by the Company was a draft Letter of
Understanding, the terms of which would allow the Company to
distribute any separation opportunities unused after the exhaustion
of the process of voluntary separation described in its first
proposal, among members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.
In the result, as a locomotive engineer leaves the Company's
workforce to be replaced by a permanently promoted trainman with
protected status, a further non-essential brakeman's position would
be permanently discontinued. Again, that position would be available
to be filled only to avoid the layoff of a protected employee at the
location in question.
The third document tabled concerned the introduction of a seniority
rule analogous to that operating on CP Rail, the effect of which
would be to further accelerate the use of reduced crews. The
Company's proposal (referred to hereinafter as "the CP Rule") was
worded as follows:
A trainman whose seniority entitles him or her to a
conductor's position or a temporary vacancy of six day's or
more or a temporary vacancy known to be of six consecutive
days or more shall not be permitted to fill a brakeman's
position if, as a result thereof, the Company would be
deprived of reducing a "reducible crew" in road freight
service. In these circumstances, the junior It protected"
conductor not holding a conductor's position or temporary
vacancy, as the case may be, will be required to fill a
conductor's position or temporary vacancy.
A fourth and final document tabled by the Company consisted of a
proposed Letter of Understanding designed to protect present
employees falling under collective agreements 4.16 and 4.3 in the
event of any further reduction in crew size beyond the limits of the
existing Reduced Freight Crew Agreement.
As is evident from the foregoing, the centerpiece of the Company's
proposal is the utilization of voluntary separation opportunities as
a means of achieving true attrition to accelerate the use of reduced
crew consists. The separation opportunities would be offered on a
terminal-by-terminal basis being equal in number to the number of
crews operating out of that terminal on a full-crew basis. In other
words, for example, where 15 of 20 freight crews running out of a
hypothetical terminal operate with full crews rather than reduced
crews, fifteen separation opportunities would be made available to
protected employees who are home-stationed at that terminal. In
the aggregate, according to the Company's calculations, a total of
approximately 580 separation opportunities would be made available
across its system nationally. The separation opportunities would
take three forms: early retirement opportunities, deferred
separation opportunities and severance or resignation opportunities,
all to be distributed in that order among protected employees on a
seniority basis. If protected employees entitled to early retirement
do not utilize all of the opportunities available at a terminal,
those entitled to deferred separation would have the next
opportunity, followed by protected employees willing to elect
severance, until the quota of available opportunities at the terminal
is exhausted. For the purposes of clarity, trainmen entitled to
early retirement opportunities are protected employees who are 55
years of age and have accumulated 85 points under the Company's
pension rules, whereby one point is given for each year of age and
each year of cumulative compensated service. As of March 1, 1990
employees in that category are entitled to retire on full pension,
without any actuarial reduction. The lump sum payment of $60,000
proposed by the Company would then be payable to that individual,
over and above his or her normal pension. Additionally, the employee
electing early retirement would be entitled to the proposed insurance
and benefit protections to the normal retirement age, and receive a
fully paid-up life insurance policy at age 65.
Under the Company's proposal certain protected employees not eligible
for early retirement would have eligibility for deferred separation
opportunities. This category would be limited to employees who are
at least 50 years of age and are within five years of eligibility for
retirement under the Company's pension rules. It cites an example of
an employee who is 50 years old and has 25 years of cumulative
compensated service. That person would be eligible for early
retirement in five years under existing rules and would, under the
Company's proposal, be eligible for a deferred separation
opportunity, whenever such an opportunity might remain available at a
given terminal after the exhaustion of the early retirement elections
of the protected employees. The protected employee voluntarily
electing a deferred separation would receive compensation calculated
on 65 percent of his or her basic weekly pay until the time that the
employee becomes eligible for early retirement, with payments to be
made on a bi-weekly basis. For road service employees this is to be
calculated on the basis of 1/52 of total earnings over the previous
26 bi-weekly pay periods. Yard service employees are to be
calculated on the basis of five days' straight time pay. Employees
treated under this provision would be required to retire when they
reach eligibility for early retirement. They would then be entitled
to a lump sum payment equating to between 30 and 40 times their basic
weekly pay. Twenty-five years of cumulative compensated service or
less would entitle the employee to 30 times the amount of basic
weekly pay, with the multiplier being increased by one up to a
maximum of 40 for each additional year of service over 25.
By way of example, the Company cites the employee who has accumulated
35 years of service. He or she would be entitled to a lump sum
payment calculated at 40 times the basic weekly pay of $1,031.11
yielding $41,244. If that employee is two and a half years from
eligibility for early retirement the total monetary value of the
Company's proposal is assessed at $128,000. It estimates that the
combination of bi- weekly payments and the lump sum payment at
retirement give to that employee the equivalent of 85 percent of
basic weekly pay over the preretirement period, assuming no lump sum
payment is made at retirement. Additionally, protected employees
electing deferred separation remain entitled to group life and
extended health care benefits up to age 65 and the receipt of a
paid-up life insurance policy at that age. In justification of this
offer, the Company notes that it was applied with the agreement of
all unions affected in 1988 upon the closure of the Company's rail
operations in Newfoundland, as well as to an agreed arrangement with
the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees in respect of a major
reorganization of track forces which involved the elimination of over
1,500 positions.
The third category of voluntary separation contemplated in the
Company's proposal is aimed at persons not eligible for early
retirement or who are not within five years of eligibility to
retire. Protected employees in that category who elect to avail
themselves of an unused separation opportunity at a given terminal
would be simply entitled to a $50,000 lump sum payment upon voluntary
resignation. Severance of employment in that circumstance would
involve no further health or insurance benefits.
Lastly, as a means of further accelerating the reduction of crews,
the Company offers a lump sum payment of $25,000 to any protected
employee not eligible for the first two options, and not electing the
third option, as a means of forfeiting his or her protected status.
In other words, where there is an unused separation opportunity in a
given terminal, the protected employee at that location who is not
eligible for early retirement or a deferred separation, and who does
not elect resignation, may surrender his or her protected employee
status in exchange for a lump sum payment of $25,000. He or she then
remains on the active workforce with no further right to claim non-
essential brakemen's assignments.
A cornerstone aspect of the proposal so advanced by the Company is
that for each voluntary surrender of a protected position a
non-essential position in a reducible crew is to be permanently
discontinued. In other words, at the terminals affected, non-
essential positions so eliminated would not be rebulletined at the
next change of timetable and would no longer be available to
protected employees who remain active, save in the circumstance where
a protected employee would otherwise be unable to hold any work at
the home station. To ensure the clear implementation of these
attrition rules, the Company would require that a process whereby all
non-essential positions discontinued pursuant to the rules are to be
so identified and to be declared permanently discontinued.
T|hereafter the discontinuation of further non-essential positions by
the election of protected employees to accept separation
opportunities or forfeit their protected status would apply only to
the remaining non-essential position. The Company's concern is to
minimize the revival of non-essential positions available to
protected employees at the change in timetable. According to its
proposal, therefore, effective October 29, 1989 where no applications
for protected employees were made in respect of non-essential
positions, such positions are to be declared permanently
discontinued, only to be filled in situations where protected
employees would otherwise be unable to hold work at their home
station.
An essential element of the Company's proposal is the determination
of a time limit during which separation opportunities and forfeitures
of protected status may be elected by eligible employees. In this
regard it proposes a period of 90 days immediately following the
effective date of the Arbitrator's Award. It submits that the 90
days is a sufficient time to permit employees to obtain such
information as they may require in respect of pension entitlements,
and to give them the needed time to reflect on the pros and cons of
their decision.
The second document tabled by the Company proposes offering unused
separation opportunities to enginemen, represented by the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers. Almost without exception employees in that
classification originally progressed through the ranks of the
trainmen's union. Trainmen are entitled to qualify as locomotive
engineers and gain standing on the locomotive engineer's seniority
list. While, generally speaking, they cannot then hold permanent
work as a locomotive engineer, over time, while working principally
as a trainman or yardman, and occasionally as a locomotive engineer
on a replacement basis, they accrue seniority which eventually allows
them to hold permanent work as an engineman, at which point they are
permanently promoted to the status of locomotive engineer. The
Company's proposal is intended to use the departure of protected
trainmen who are promoted to the rank of permanent locomotive
engineer as a further means of attrition in the reduction of
non-essential trainmen's positions.
The Company notes that this concept of attrition was accepted by the
Union in the agreement governing the reduction in the consist of yard
crews. Under that agreement, one non-essential position of yard
helper was discontinued for each protected employee promoted to a
locomotive engineer's position. It submits that the same principle
should operate in respect of the reduction of non-essential
brakeman's positions in freight crew consists. According to the
terms of the -Company's proposal, it could enter into an agreement
with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers whereby separation
opportunities initially identified as available to trainmen which
went unused, could thereafter be made available to locomotive
engineers, on condition that the separation of the locomotive
engineer would trigger the promotion of a protected employee to the
locomotive engineers' working list. The promotion of the protected
employee out of the ranks of the trainmen's bargaining unit would
then result in the permanent discontinuance of a non-essential
position at the terminal in question, in the same manner as is
described above, subject always to its availability to protected
trainmen remaining in service who would otherwise be unable to hold
work at that home terminal.
The third document tabled by the Company concerns the acceleration of
attrition by rules governing the ability of protected employees to
elect to fill non-essential |brakemen's positions in circumstances
where they have sufficient seniority to hold a conductor's position.
The Company's concern is that under the present rules a protected
employee can elect to fill a non-essential rear end brakeman's
position, thereby waiving the opportunity to hold a conductor's
position. This occasionally results in a crew being composed of a
non-protected employee occupying the conductor's position while a
non-essential rear end brakeman is required to be assigned because
that position has been elected by a protected employee with greater
seniority. The Company submits that that result runs counter to the
underlying purpose of the Reduced Freight Crew Agreement. It
therefore proposes that in circumstances when a non-protected
employee would be the successful applicant to a conductor's position
advertised pursuant to the provisions which require the posting of
permanent or temporary vacancies, the junior protected employee who
would otherwise occupy a non-essential position, will be required to
fill the conductor's position. By way of precedent for this
arrangement the Company points to the existing provisions of the
collective agreements which compel a junior qualified conductor to
fill a posted conductor's position when there are no voluntary
applicants for it.
The Company's fourth and final proposal consists of a document
clarifying the work entitlements of non-protected employees who are
employed as of the date of the Memorandum of Settlement of August 29,
1989, and employees hired after that date. It guarantees protected
status to non-protected employees who were working on that date in
respect of all positions to which they are presently entitled to
work. In other words, non-protected employees on the payroll, as of
August 29, 1989, gain protected status in the event of any future
reduction of crews beyond the size of crew consist in freight service
established in the existing Reduced Freight Crew Agreement.
The Company cites a number of further arguments in general support of
its overall proposal. It underscores, of course, the voluntary
nature of the election of separation opportunities which is at the
heart of its proposal to attain true attrition. No protected
employees forfeit their employment, or their protected status, unless
they freely elect to do so. The choice to so elect is not coerced,
but is made attractive by what the Company characterizes as generous
retirement and severance incentives. It argues that in fact no
employee remaining in the work force, whether protected or non-
protected, will suffer adversely by the operation of its proposal,
and that specifically no employee will lose work as a result of it.
In the Company's view the likely outcome of the implementation of its
proposal is that non-essential positions on less desirable
assignments will in all likelihood be discontinued and be no longer
available to protected employees, save where they would otherwise
be laid off. However, the loss of the opportunity to to a less
desirable job assignment is a disadvantage that is more theoretical
than real. The Employer further suggests that in fact the taking up
of early retirement and deferred separation opportunities will result
in the vacating of assignments by relatively senior employees,
resulting in the greater availability of more desirable jobs for
junior protected employees. Moreover, to the extent that the Union
argues that the reduction of non-essential positions will adversely
impact on the work opportunities of protected spare board employees,
the Company cites its proposal, whereby there is provision to
increase the number of available separation opportunities at
locations where there are protected employees on the spare board, up
to a maximum of 25 percent. To the suggestion of the Union that a
reduction in the number of non-essential positions will make
non-protected employees more vulnerable to layoff as they may be
displaced from essential positions, the Company submits that that is
the natural consequence of non- protected status, as in any system
where layoff is to be implemented on the basis of seniority. In the
Employer's view the establishment of the two classes of protected
employees was never intended as a form of job security for
non-protected bargaining unit members. That, it submits, is
inherent in the original Reduced Freight Crew Agreements.
©b47r V. THE UNION'S POSITION
Not surprisingly, the position of the Union before the Arbitrator is
in substantial disagreement with the Company's proposal. It submits
that the present freight crew consist rule provides a sufficient
formula for gradual reducibility, and should not be amended. In its
view the existing rule meets the needs of the Company to eventually
achieve full reducibility through attrition while, at the same time,
protecting the job security and seniority rights of its membership.
Its representatives argue that any tampering with a previously agreed
attrition formula may have a serious impact on labour relations
generally, resulting in an erosion of mutual trust.
The Union invokes the history of attrition as a concept to deal with
reductions in the face of non-essential positions within the railway
industry. It cites the history of the protections accorded to
locomotive firemen on both CP Rail and CN following the Kellock Royal
Commission Report of the 1950s. Additionally, it refers to the
implementation of the run-throughs dealt with by the Freedman
Industrial Inquiry which endorsed the concept of the sharing of cost
savings among impacted employees. It further points to the
principles underlying the agreements reached in the 1960s at both CN
and CP for the reduction of yard crew consists and the agreement made
in 1968 which paved the way for reduced passenger crew consists, with
rights to certain positions in passenger service. It notes in
particular that revisions to the passenger crew consist agreement
made in a recent round of bargaining with VIA Rail, resulting in
accelerated reducibility, comprised advantages to employees including
a share in productivity gains, increased wages for reduced crew
members and certain maintenance of earnings provisions.
The Union also draws to the Arbitrator's attention the content of
certain short-line crew consist reduction agreements which have been
implemented in Canada. It cites recent examples of agreements
governing crew reductions on B.C. Rail and the Algoma Central
Railway, noting that the Algoma Central Agreement includes a premium
pay for reduced crew members. Similarly, an agreement negotiated
between the Union and the Essex Terminal Railway provides reduced
crew members a premium of $10.56 for each shift. These examples are
advanced by the Union in support of its argument that the concept of
a share in productivity savings is an important feature in agreements
of this kind, along with attrition rules which touch upon job
security and protection dates. It notes that the most recent
agreements, including Algoma Central and Essex Terminal, incorporate
a form of share in productivity savings through the payment of
"Lonesome Pay", a concept with precedent in the Reduced Freight Crew
Agreements negotiated by the Union in railways in the United States,
as well as with VIA Rail.
The Union further challenges the Company's arguments based on
competitive productivity, in particular as regards its position
relative to CP Rail. It submits that a truer productivity reading is
to be gained from figures respecting the ratio of tonne kilometers
hauled per employee (employee meaning conductors and brakeman) in a
given year. It cites, for example, that in 1966 CP Rail had 2,573
conductors and brakemen in freight service who hauled 177 billion
gross tonne kilometers, for an average of 68.79 million gross tonne
kilometers per employee. In comparison, CN in the same year utilized
3,253 brakemen to handle 245 gross tonne kilometers, or 75.32 million
gross tonne kilometers per employee. To further question the
Company's premises with respect to productivity, it draws to the
Arbitrator's attention the fact that in the same year, according to
Statistics Canada figures, the average number of cars on CP trains
was 71.1 while on CN it was 77.3, with CN cars being 8.7% longer than
those of CP Rail. The Union's representatives argue that longer
trains mean fewer trains operating, which may to some extent explain
why CN has fewer reduced crew starts than its major competitor.
In general terms, the Union views the Company's proposal as designed
to achieve significant long-term savings to the railway in a mariner
that is not commensurate with the impact on seniority rights,
quality of work, job opportunities and overall earnings. which may
be brought to bear on its members. The first position of the Union
as noted above is that the existing rules governing the utilization
of reduced crews should not be altered. It argues that these
provisions were agreed to in good faith in 1978, and subsequently in
1982, and should not now be revised in a way that differs from the
expectation of employees in the bargaining unit.
The Union argues that a number of factors, some of which are within
the control of management, have influenced the reducibility of crews.
Already mentioned is the use of longer trains: as fewer trains are
operated, fewer employees are needed and more protected employees
remain available to fill non-essential brakemen's assignments.
Further, the Union cites declines in business suffered by the
railways, particularly in the reduction of bulk commodity traffic in
1988 and 1989. To the extent that this too resulted in fewer freight
trains being run, the bidding into non-essential positions by
protected employees became more frequent.
The Union also argues the impact of a number of technological and
operational changes that have been introduced at various terminals
across Canada, resulting in an overall reduction in work
opportunities in both road and yard service. In this regard it
points to some 100 jobs lost as a result of technological and
operational changes in Western Canada alone, and refers generally to
similar impacts in Eastern and Central Canada, including the closing
of the Newfoundland Railway and terminal closures within the Great
Lakes Region. The Union also reminds the Arbitrator of the effect of
recent substantial cutbacks in employment opportunities at VIA
Rail. Reciprocal agreements affecting CN, VIA Rail and the UTU
allowed certain UTU members to return to service with CN from VIA
Rail. In doing so they displaced junior employees from positions at
CN. In the Union's submissions, but for the job security aspects of
the freight crew consists rules, its membership within CN would have
suffered greatly as a result of the VIA Rail cutbacks.
The Union also notes the displacement impact of abolishments of
yardmaster and engineer positions within CN's system generally.
As such employees exercise their acquired seniority rights to return
to trainmen's positions, they displace into the bargaining unit,
impacting negatively on the job security of existing members. To the
extent that non-essential positions are absolutely reduced, the
Union submits that such "bumping back" into the bargaining unit by
yardmen and locomotive engineers will have still greater adverse
impact on job security.
The Union further questions the legitimacy of the Company's proposal
in light of what it terms under-utilization of reduced crews under
existing rules. In particular, it points to the fact that the
Company frequently opts to operate with a full crew, rather than with
a reduced crew, because the rules permit a full crew to work eleven
hours before becoming eligible to book rest, while reduced
crews may take rest after a shorter tour of ten hours on duty.
Additionally, the Union argues that by allowing locomotive engineers
to earn mileage beyond the maximum contemplated in the regulations,
the Company knowingly reduces the frequency of opportunities for
trainmen qualified as engineers to work in that capacity, thereby
promoting the greater likelihood of protected trainmen being
compelled to fill reducible positions. |The Union further raises the
effect of what it characterizes as underlying restrictive policies of
the Company with respect to leaves and time off. It argues that to
the extent that the Company has limited the opportunities to take
voluntary leaves, without pay, or in some instances leaves to to
temporary vacancies at VIA Rail, it has indirectly contributed to
protected employees being available to bid onto non-essential
positions. It cites the similar effect of a restrictive policy of
the Company with respect to the computation of trainmen's vacation
days.
The Union does not oppose all aspects of the Company's proposals.
Specifically, it has no objection to the Company having the right to
offer more ear|iv retirement opportunities to its members on a
voluntary basis. It submits that that measure, combined with an
adjustment in management policies in the areas reviewed above would,
standing alone, achieve an acceleration in the reduction of
non-essential brakemen's positions.
The alternative position of the Union is that if there is to be
modification of the reduced freight crew agreement, any changes
should ensure that four conditions are included:
1. Job security protection.
2. Retirement opportunities.
3. Share of the productivity savings.
4. Work rule improvements.
By job security protection the Union means provisions whereby the
employees are guaranteed that there will be no loss of earnings as a
result of a modification of the reduced freight crew consist
agreement. Specifically, it maintains that reducible positions in
freight service should remain accessible in the event of any further
impacts on the workforce such as external events like VIA Rail
reductions, terminal closures, pool car or crew reductions and the
like. Additionally, in the Union's view, the existing number of
positions in road service should remain available to employees in
yard service who may be negatively impacted by job reductions. The
Union also proposes that provision be made for ensuring that
reducible positions are given to employees whose capacity to work is
reduced due to illness or injury.
While the fundamental position of the Union is that any modification
of the rule should result in no employee being laid off, it tables an
alternative. It maintains that in the event that an unprotected
employee is laid off as a result of changes in the Reduced Freight
Crew Agreement, wage protection must be provided to the laid-off
employee. It would calculate wage protection based upon 80 percent
of an employee's previous year's earnings. Additionally, in the case
of employees who are not laid off but whose work opportunities are
reduced, the Union proposes an earnings protection formula, based
upon the previous 52 weeks' earnings, or a guarantee of 3,800 miles
per month, whichever is greater. Further the Union seeks the
establishment of a new employee protection date. It would apply to
all employees, guaranteeing their entitlement to work in freight
service, as a conductor or trainman, until retirement, resignation
or any other means of separation from service.
The Union submits that any retirement opportunities made available
should be generous in number. It proposes that the average number of
reducible positions be calculated on each district, with credits for
spare board relief. It notes that in the previous reduced freight
crew agreements a factor of 25 percent of the number of reducible
positions has been included as representing the spare board. In the
Union's view 33.3 percent would be a more realistic factor.
With respect to the amount of the retirement separation allowance,
the Union proposes that it should be no less than $80,000 per
employee, with unused retirement opportunities to be carried forward
until all are used. It also proposes terms that would allow the lump
sum payments to be taken, at the option of the employee, for a period
of up to 12 months in two installments.
Following the precedent of the Newfoundland Railway Closure
Agreement, the Union further proposes a bridging provision. It would
be available to any employees fifty years of age or older to the date
that they are eligible for retirement under the CN pension rules, and
the separation allowance, at 80 percent of their wages. Under the
terms of the Union's position employees taking early retirement under
this modified rule would maintain dental, extended health care and
life insurance coverage.
As noted above, a share in the productivity savings to be realized
through changes in the reduced crew rules is proposed by the Union.
It maintains that the rates of pay for conductors be increased to
equal the locomotive engineers' rates, and that the brakeman's rate
be upgraded to the equivalent of conductor's rates. This, it
submits, would produce an equitable share of the productivity
savings, directed to the employees who are compelled to work in
reduced freight crew service. The Union further demands a reduction
of the maximum mileage limitations established for pay purposes, and
for yard service employees the reduction of the basic day from eight
hours to six hours per shift. It also proposes a more generous
formula of graduated vacation benefits.
Following the presentation of its position at the hearings, the Union
offered rebuttal to the positions and arguments of the Company.
While it made a number of submissions in that regard, as several
of them overlap the thrust of its submission in chief, they need not
be reviewed here in detail. Two of the arguments presented by the
Union rebuttal, however, raised issues of substance which caused the
Arbitrator to seek further clarification from the Company. The
first position advanced by the Union is that the permanent
elimination of reducible positions will result in a reduction in road
service work opportunities, which in turn will have a displacement
impact. By referring to examples at the three terminals of
Garneau, Biggar and Sarnia, the Union's representatives tabled
scenarios in which they maintain the reduction in road service
opportunities will force employees to move onto the spare board and
ultimately displace others, causing layoffs among unprotected
employees. Secondly, the Union submits that adopting the "CP Rule",
whereby protected trainmen with the seniority to claim conductor's
work must do so if their filling a brakeman's position would deprive
the Company operating with a reducible crew in freight service would
result in employees being laid off. By examining the fact scenario
which it maintains exists at Hornepayne, the Union argues that the
operation of that rule can cause a ripple effect, the result of which
will be the layoff of trainmen. Additionally, by examining the
potential impact of the Company's proposals at Capreol, the Union
maintains that the predictability and regularity of
assignments will be disrupted, impacting negatively on the quality of
working life of the employees concerned.
...
SEE PART C