AH575
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
BETWEEN
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY
(the “Company”)
AND
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS
SYSTEM COUNCIL NO. 11
(the “Union”)
RE: GRIEVANCE OF W. ARCHIBALD
Sole
Arbitrator: Michel G. Picher
Appearing For The Union:
Ken
Stuebing – Counsel
Brian
Strong – Sr. System General Chairman
Donald
McLaughlin – System General Chairman
Luc
Couture – International Representative
Wilt
Archibald – Grievor
Appearing For The Company:
Caroline
Gilbert – Manager, Labour Relations
Alain
deMontigny – Manager, Labour Relations
Randy
Ward – S&C Supervisor
Eric
Leduc – Manager, Engineering, Atlantic
A hearing in this matter was
held in Montreal on Wednesday, May 7, 2008.
AWARD
This is a grievance
against discharge for an alleged violation of Rule G as well as a violation of
the Company’s Drug and Alcohol Policy. The Company’s ex parte statement of issue reads as follows:
DISPUTE:
The dismissal of S&C Installation Mechanic Mr. Bill Archibald.
COMPANY’S STATEMENT OF ISSUE:
S&C Installation Mechanic Mr. Bill Archibald was dismissed from Company service for alleged “Violation of CN Drug and Alcohol Policy and Rule “G” on June 25 2007.
The Union contends that there is no cause for discipline in the circumstances or, in the alternative, that the penalty of discharge is excessive.
The Union requests that Mr. Archibald be reinstated.
The Company disagrees and denies the Union’s request.
There is no
substantial conflict with respect to the facts. An employee of twenty-nine
years’ service, Signal & Communications Installation Mechanic Archibald
held a safety-sensitive position within the S&C department at Moncton, New
Brunswick. Before the commencement of the grievor’s tour of duty on June 25, 2007
S&C Supervisor Randy Ward received a phone call from an employee expressing
concern that Mr. Archibald appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. As
appears from the grievor’s own statement at the disciplinary investigation
conducted by the Company on July 4, 2007, Mr. Archibald was approached by Mr.
Ward and was informed that someone had reported a smell of alcohol on his
breath. Thereafter both the grievor’s local chairman, Mr. Donald McLaughlin and
Engineering Manager Eric Leduc were called to attend at the scene. It does not
appear disputed that after their arrival Mr. Leduc expressed to Mr. McLaughlin
that the situation might involve the possible application of the Rule G by-pass
agreement. CN Police were also summoned and proceeded to perform a breathalyser
test, a test which normally involves the taking of two samples. The first
sample was taken, which registered “failure”, meaning a unacceptably high blood
alcohol count. However, the battery on the CN Police Officer’s breathalyser
failed, and a second test, which is normally performed in accordance with
Company procedure, was not possible.
A number of
issues arise. Firstly, the Company
maintains that on the date in question the grievor was still under the
conditions of a last chance continuation of employment agreement. According to
the terms of that agreement the consumption of alcohol would render him subject
to discharge. The Union maintains that in fact the last chance agreement had
expired on the date of these events. Secondly, the Union maintains that in the
circumstances the Company was obligated to treat the grievor under the terms of
the Rule G Bypass Agreement, a position disputed by the Company. Finally, the
Union maintains that, in any event, the Company has not properly discharged its
burden of proof of establishing that the grievor violated either Rule G or the
Company’s policy on drugs and alcohol.
The
Arbitrator deals firstly with the issue of last chance agreement. In June of
2005 the grievor was subject to discipline by reason of having left his
assignment without authorization on January 25, 2005, in circumstances which
appear to have involved the consumption of alcohol. The parties then signed a
last chance reinstatement contract, with the grievor being returned to work on
June 27, 2005 following a four month suspension without pay. The contract,
dated June 16, 2005, contains a number of conditions, including an absolute
prohibition against the consumption of drugs or alcohol at any time. While it
is dated June 16, 2005, the first paragraph of the conditions states, in part:
1. This contract begins upon your signature and last for a minimum term of two years; …
The grievor
signed the contract on June 21, 2005, the same day it was signed by Mr. John M.
Greene, on behalf of the Company. The signature of the Union’s representative,
General Chair Richard Hunt, was added to the contract on June 28, 2005.
The Company
maintains that June 28, 2005 is the start date of the two year last chance
agreement as applied to Mr. Archibald. The Arbitrator cannot agree. This
appears manifestly to be a situation in which the contra proferentem rule of
interpretation has some application. It holds that the terms of a contract
should be strictly applied as against the party which was itself the author or
draftsperson of the document. While the last chance agreement signed by Mr.
Archibald is on its face a document negotiated among the Company, the grievor
and his union, the reality is that the terms and conditions of the agreement
were essentially determined and articulated by the Company itself. For reasons
it best appreciates, it stipulated that the contract was to be for a two year
period beginning at the time the grievor signed it. Moreover, it appears clear
that the signature of Mr. Hunt, on behalf of the Union, appended approximately
a week later, was in the nature of a ratification of that which had already
been discussed and agreed upon verbally. In fact, Mr. Hunt signed on June 28
which, apparently, was the day after the employee’s return to work on June 27,
2005. Given the clear language of the agreement itself the Arbitrator cannot
see upon what basis it can be concluded that the two year agreement must be
deemed to have commenced on June 28, 2005. By its own terms, it must clearly be
viewed as having commenced on June 21, 2005 and having expired two calendar
years after that date. On that basis I am satisfied that the Company cannot
invoke the terms of the last chance agreement for the purposes of the
discipline assessed against Mr. Archibald arising out of the events of June 25,
2007.
Can it be
said that the Rule G Bypass Agreement must apply in this case? I think not. The
preamble to the Rule G Bypass Agreement states:
Employees who have consumed alcohol and/or drugs while subject to duty or while on duty will not be dismissed on the first occasion when the incident is reported by a co-worker to management.
(emphasis added)
The agreement then goes on to describe the procedures to be
followed when the Rule G Bypass Agreement is invoked.
In the
Arbitrator’s view the Rule G Bypass Agreement is a salutary document whose
operation should not be frustrated or undermined. It is obviously a useful
instrument to promote safety and allow a form of amnesty to employees who are
observed by others to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol while at work.
Significantly, by its own terms, the policy is intended to be applied to the
“first occasion” that an employee is reported to be impaired while on duty or
subject to duty. In the grievor’s case that is plainly not what occurred on
June 25, 2007. On that date Mr. Archibald had freshly completed a two year last
chance agreement which was in fact precipitated by his own prior violation of
the Company’s policy in respect of drugs and alcohol in 2005. He was, in other
words, not a candidate for the application of the Rule G Bypass Agreement.
While there may have been some initial indication on the part of Mr. Leduc that
there might be a possible application of that agreement to Mr. Archibald, it is
clear that Mr. Leduc was not then aware that Mr. Archibald had been subject to
prior discipline, and the terms of a last chance agreement, for a previous
infraction involving the consumption of alcohol.
The final
issue is whether in fact the grievor was impaired when he came to work on the
morning of June 25, 2007, and if so, the measure of discipline which is
appropriate in all of the circumstances. Counsel for the Union strenuously
argues that the evidence presented at the disciplinary investigation does not
confirm that the grievor was under the influence at the time. The Arbitrator
cannot agree. Even if one accepts that
the evidence of the supervisors who observed the grievor, and the negative
single breathalyser result indicating impairment is not admissible, there is
ample material within the four corners of the Company’s investigation to make a
conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, as to the state of the grievor on
the morning of June 25, 2007. As noted above, the Company’s investigation was conducted
on the afternoon of July 4, 2007. Through the course of the questions and
answers the grievor confirms that he was viewed by an unidentified employee as
having a smell of alcohol on his breath. He admits having taken the
breathalyser test. When asked “Were you drinking prior to coming to work?” he
responds “Yes”. While he does state that he thought that the alcohol would have
cleared his system, at no point during the investigation does Mr. Archibald
deny having been under the influence of alcohol when he reported for work on
the morning of June 25, 2007. To put it bluntly, during the course of the
investigation the grievor was obviously being confronted by a Company
investigator who had, albeit indirectly, information of a report with respect
to the grievor appearing to have been under the influence when he came to work
on the morning of June 25, 2007. In a review of those facts Mr. Archibald, who
had his Union representative with him, gave no precise information as to when
he had consumed alcohol, or how much. Within the record of the investigation he
simply admitted to having consumed alcohol “prior to coming to work”. He never
expressly denied that he was in fact under the influence of alcohol that
morning. Faced with a record so compelling, the Arbitrator is satisfied, on the
balance of probabilities, that Mr. Archibald did violate Rule G and the
Company’s Drug and Alcohol Policy and was impaired when he appeared for work on
the morning of June 25, 2007.
The only
real issue is the appropriate measure of discipline in all of the
circumstances. As indicated above, this is not a case in which the Company can
rely upon the terms of the last chance agreement, an agreement which I am
satisfied had expired at the time of these events. There are, in addition, a
number of mitigating factors to take into consideration. By his own admission,
Mr. Archibald is an alcoholic. He has had the benefit of participating in the
activities of Alcoholics Anonymous for some three years, during which he was
able to successfully honour the terms of his continuing employment agreement
with the Company between June of 2005 and June of 2007. While it is obvious
that he had a relapse, as this Arbitrator has acknowledged, that is not an
uncommon event in the history of alcoholics generally (see, e.g., CROA 3355). The evidence also indicates
that since his isolated relapse in June of 2007, Mr. Archibald has continued to
abstain from alcohol and participate in Alcoholics Anonymous. Finally, as
indicated at the outset of this award, he is an employee of twenty-nine years’
service whose disciplinary record is otherwise not negative.
In all of
the circumstances, the Arbitrator is satisfied that this is an appropriate case
for a substitution of penalty, albeit on conditions fashioned to protect the
Company’s interests. The Arbitrator therefore directs that the grievor be
reinstated into his employment forthwith, without compensation for wages and
benefits lost and without loss of seniority. Mr. Archibald’s reinstatement
shall, however, be conditional upon his accepting the following conditions for
a period of not less than two years from his first day of return to work:
He shall continue in regular
attendance at the meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous, or such other similar
organization as may be agreed, with his attendance to be certified to the
Company and to the Union by an officer of that organization on not less than a
quarterly basis;
He shall abstain from the consumption
of alcohol and illegal drugs, and shall be subject to unannounced random drug
and alcohol testing, to be administered by the Company in a non-abusive fashion;
A positive drug or alcohol test or
the refusal to take such a test shall be grounds for the termination of his
employment, with access to the grievance and arbitration procedure to be
limited to the question of whether the violation in fact occurred.
The
Arbitrator retains jurisdiction in the event of any dispute between the parties
respecting the interpretation or implementation of this award.
Dated at Ottawa this 13th day of May, 2008
_________________________________
MICHEL G. PICHER
ARBITRATOR