Heard in Montreal, Thursday, 14 January 1999

concerning

and

Interpretation and application of paragraph (g)(iii) of the definition section of the Job Security Agreement ("JSA").

Paragraph (g)(iii) of the definition section of the JSA provides that "time off duty on account of illness, injury, authorized maternity leave, to attend committee meetings, called to court as a witness, or for uncompensated jury duty not exceeding a total of 100 days in any calendar year, shall be included in the computation of cumulative compensated service ("CCS"). The Company takes the position that this paragraph has no application in employment security ("ES") situations. Rather, the Company believes that the paragraph provides that a maximum of 100 days may be included in the calculation of CCS only in lay-off situations. The Brotherhood disagrees.

The Union contends that: 1.) Paragraph (g)(iii) of the definition section of the JSA has full application in the calculation of CCS for ES purposes; 2.) The Company’s position is in violation of paragraph (g)(iii) and article 7 of the JSA; 3.) The Company’s position discriminates against workers who, because of authorized absences on account of illness or injury or maternity leave, would otherwise be eligible for ES, this in violation of article 7(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Union requests that the Brotherhood’s interpretation be found to be correct and that paragraph (g)(iii) of the definition section of the JSA.

At the hearing the Brotherhood indicated that it was not pursuing at arbitration the issue of the application of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The issue therefore is whether paragraph (g)(iii) of the definition section of the Job Security Agreement applies for the purposes of calculating an employee’s entitlement to employment security. The position of the Company is that since the inception of the agreement the time off duty provision found in paragraph (g)(iii) has applied only to determining an employee’s entitlement to layoff benefits.

The item in question reads as follows:

It is common ground that the language of the foregoing provision pre-dates the existence of employment security, a concept which came into existence in 1985. The Company submits that from the inception of ES the understanding which it had with all of the non-operating unions which were subject to the Job Security Agreement has consistently been that paragraph (g)(iii) does not apply for the purposes of calculating an employee’s entitlement to ES. Rather, according to its submission, the provision has always been interpreted to be limited to determining an employee’s entitlement to layoff benefits. This, its representatives submit, has been the consistent application of the provision over a number of notices of technological, operational and organizational changes which have issued over the years under article 8 of the Job Security Agreement, including changes affecting employees represented by the instant Union. In support of its submission the Company supplied the Arbitrator with letters from two union representatives of other signatory organizations, confirming their understanding that the traditional application of paragraph (g)(iii) has been in accordance with the Company’s interpretation. The letters further confirm that a recent renegotiation of the Job Security Agreements affecting those organizations, which now expressly distinguishes the application of the concept of cumulative compensated service for the separate purposes of layoff benefits and employment security, is merely a confirmation of the practice and understanding which was always in place.