BETWEEN

(the "Company")

AND

(the "Union")

SOLE ARBITRATOR: J. F. W. Weatherill

J.W. Asprey

A. Manocchio

J.E. Cameron

A hearing in this matter was held in Montreal, on October 11, 1977.

The Joint Statement of Fact and Joint Statement of Issue in this matter are as follows:

Bulletin No. 17, referred to in the Joint Statement, is as follows:

* * * * * * * * *

That bulletin has been found, in a separate award, not to have been in sufficient compliance with the requirements of article 23.11 with respect to job bulletins. The question with respect to that particular bulletin may be described as a close one, since some degree of specification of the work involved is set out. No particular relief was sought with respect to that bulletin, the issue in that case being a general question of interpretation of article 23.11. It is important to note that my decision in the instant case does not turn on the finding made in the other case, nor any determination as to the sufficiency or otherwise of any particular bulletin. The instant case is strictly one of the interpretation of article 35.1 of the collective agreement.

The notice posted by the Union and referred to in the Joint Statement is as follows:

Article 35.1 of the collective agreement is as follows:

The issue to be determined may be very simply put: was the notice above set out one which was "of direct interest to employees" within the meaning of article 35.1? There is no doubt that the article was posted on proper authority, and the question is whether the Company violated the collective agreement in removing it. It would appear that, were it not for article 35.1, the Company would have acted within its rights. In my view, the notice in question was one "of direct interest to employees" within the meaning of article 35.1. It referred to a particular job posting which had been made, and set out for the employees certain information which the Union properly and reasonably would interest employees who might be considering the bulletin. Clearly employees would be entitled to consult their Union officers with respect to any posted job, and it would be proper Union activity to give reasonable information available with respect to it. There are, obviously, certain limits to the sort of advice a Union could, properly give employees with respect to their work, but nothing in this case touches in any significant way on those limits.

It may be observed that the Union's notice might give rise to some confusion: there were two positions available, while the Union notice appears to contemplate only one. This error was not intended to confuse, and it does not appear that in fact any individual was prejudiced thereby. It was a "proper" notice within the meaning of article 35.1, even although it may have been, to the degree noted, in error.

There may, of course, be notices which are of interest to employees and which may not be posted and which, if posted, may be removed because they are not proper, in that they are vulgar, or incite breaches of the collective agreement, or some other reason. That is not the case here. Article 35.1 does not limit matters of "interest" to employees to social matters or individual notices of items for sale, or the like. It may quite normally and naturally be read as including matters relating to work, and this is particularly so where the matter is one dealt with in the collective agreement.

It should, also be added that the Union offers such information or advice to employees at its own risk. It is perhaps not the best source for information relating to particular jobs. Employees must, in the long run, judge for themselves. But the matter is one of interest to them, and the notice in this case, whatever its shortcomings, was a proper one.

For the foregoing reasons, it is my award that the Company was in violation of article 35.1 in removing the notice in question.

DATED at Toronto, this 17th day of October, 1977.

ARBITRATOR