BETWEEN:

(the "Company")

AND

(the "Union")

SOLE ARBITRATOR: J. F. W. Weatherill

A hearing in this matter was held at Montreal on July 26, 1988.

The grievance in this case alleges that the company is in violation of Rule 53.2 and Appendix XVII of Agreement 12.35 in requiring train crews to perform certain air brake tests at Ridley Island, effective January 26, 1987.

The Joint Statement of Issue in this matter is as follows:

Ridley Island is a grain and coal trains-shipment facility, located about seven miles south of Prince Rupert. It began handling trains in October, 1984, and was officially opened in May, 1985. It is a facility for unit train operation. An average of 3.5 loaded trains arrive per day, and about the same number depart. Arrival and departure times fluctuate widely.

When grain trains are made up for departure, an air brake test must be performed. Until the change which is the subject of this case, the air brake test was performed by Carmen, called from their duties at Prince Rupert and sent by truck to Ridley Island, where they coupled air hoses and performed the air brake tests and related inspections. Travel time was about one-half hour each way, and the time taken by the air brake test and inspection was about one hour.

Tests on coal trains are of a somewhat different nature and require somewhat less time. Again, they were made by Carmen called from Prince Rupert.

With respect to grain trains, it appears that the Carmen had performed, as they were qualified to do, a No. 1 air brake test. The train crews now required to do the work are not qualified to perform the No. 1 air brake test, and instead perform the No. 1-A air brake test. This is a slightly different test. With respect to coal trains, a No. 2 air brake test was performed by Carmen and is now performed by train crews.

There is no issue before me as to the compliance of the company with the requirements of RTC Order No. R-38352, governing air brake tests to departing trains. Neither is there any issue as to the qualifications of train crews to do the work which is now assigned to them. The question is whether or not, under the provisions of the collective agreement, the company is required to assign the work in question to Carmen.

The work is, of course, within the scope of Carmen’s work. While some air brake testing may require particular qualifications and certification, and so would, as a matter of fact, be exclusively performed by Carmen by virtue of certain Regulations in that regard, the testing which is now required to be performed by train crews at Ridley Island is not exclusive to Carmen for that reason: the question before me is only whether or not the air brake testing assignments now given to train crews at Ridley Island ought, by reason of the provisions of the collective agreement, to be given to Carmen.

There is, as I have said, no doubt that the work in question may properly be performed by Carmen. It is work coming within the general scope of Rule 53.2. The collective agreement does not, however, provide that such work is exclusive to Carmen, and it is recognized that in some circumstances some at least of such work may properly be performed by members of train crews. Thus, collective agreement 4.3 between the company and the United Transportation Union, representing the train crews, provides, in Rule 69.1:

If Ridley Island were a "terminal", then in cases where carmen are "employed and on duty", train crews might, in reliance on their own collective agreement, object to being required to perform air brake tests. That, however, is not this case, which is not a complaint by train crews, but is a demand by Carmen that the work in question be assigned to them. The Carmen’s collective agreement does not provide that their jurisdiction to perform such work is exclusive, and Rule 53.2 does not appear to have been violated in the circumstances of this case. In this respect, what was said in SHP Case No. 105 (although the facts in that case were different), is of significance here:

Reference is also made in the Joint Statement to Appendix XVII to the collective agreement. That is in the form of a letter dated December 18, 1985, in which certain commitments are made by the company. The following Portions of Appendix XVII are material to the instant case:

Whether or not Ridley Island may be said to be a "terminal", or a part of the terminal at Prince Rupert, are not questions which need be answered in the present case. The fact is that the obligation set out in Appendix XVII so far as the present case at least is concerned, was met. That obligation ceased, by the terms of Appendix XVII, on December 31, 1986. The company did not violate that obligation in making the changes in assignment which led to the present grievance. Those changes were made in 1987. There has, accordingly, been no violation of Appendix XVII in this case.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it must be my conclusion that the provisions of the collective agreement have not been violated. Accordingly, the grievance must be dismissed.

DATED AT TORONTO, this 12th day of August, 1988.

Arbitrator