SHP – 498
IN THE MATTER OF
AN ARBITRATION
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
(the “Company”)
AND
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION
OF CANADA (CAW-CANADA) LOCAL 101
(the “Union”)
IN THE MATTER OF
THE GRIEVANCE OF Carman
Vic Legare
SOLE ARBITRATOR: Sidney G. Soronow
There
appeared on behalf of the Company:
And on
behalf of the Union:
A hearing in
this matter was held at ….
AWARD
At the
outset of the hearing, the parties agreed that the arbitrator was duly and
properly appointed. The parties further agreed that the arbitrator had
jurisdiction to decide the issues raised by the grievance. No preliminary
objections were raised as to jurisdiction or other matters.
The parties
had failed to agree upon an arbitrator. As such, the arbitrator was appointed
by the Federal Minister of Labour. Under the Canada Labour Code, it is contemplated the arbitrator’s decision
will be made within sixty (60) days of the appointment. However, in this
instance there was some delay in the parties agreeing to a hearing date. The
parties confirmed that they were waiving the time provision contained in
Section 64 of the Canada Labour Code.
As well, the parties waived any time provision for the delivery of this Award,
pursuant to the terms of the Collective Agreement.
Canadian
Pacific Railway Company (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the “Railway” or
the “Company”) is a party to a Collective Agreement with National Automobile ,
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers’ Union of Canada (CAW-Canada)
Local 101 (sometimes hereinafter referred as “CAW” or the “Union”). The
Collective Agreement is dated December 20, 1996. It was brought to the
attention of the arbitrator that a subsequent agreement has been entered into
between the parties, however the Collective Agreement dated December 20,1996 is
the agreement in effect for the purposes of this grievance.
The
Collective Agreement contemplates that the parties will submit to the
arbitrator a Joint Statement of Fact and Issue (the “Joint Statement”). The
Joint Statement, in large measure, frames the difference or issue between the
parties. In this instance, the Joint Statement reads as follows:
DISPUTE:
9BARB
/ 29 - K MG0062 grievance on behalf of Carman Vic Legare for alleged violation
of Rule 6 and 44.2.
STATEMENT OF FACT:
Mr.
Legare is a member of the established Health, Safety and Environment Committee
in accordance with the Canada Labour Code Part II and chosen by the Union. On
April 15, 1998 the grievor was performing his duties as per requirements of a
Health and Safety Committee member. At the same time the supplementary service
crew was called to service and performed their duties until their work was
completed at 22:00 hours.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE:
It is
the submission of the Union that Mr. Legare was readily available to assume his
duties under the supplementary service after the completion of his duties as a
Health and Safety Committee member. The Union requests the arbitrator award
that Mr. Legare be paid 4.20 hours at the prevailing overtime rates for reasons
that the Company violated Rule 6 and Rule 44.2.
The
Company denies the Union’s contention and claims.
The events
giving rise to this grievance occurred on April 15,1998. On that date, there
was a scheduled meeting of the Safety and Health Committee, of which Mr. Legare
was a member.
A mishap
had occurred outside of Mr. Legare’s home terminal in Moose Jaw. As a result ,
there was a Supplementary Service call involving manpower being dispatched to
the Regina area.
Mr. Legare
is a fulltime Carman. Additionally, Mr. Legare (a thirty year employee of the
Railway) holds a permanent position on the Road Board for Supplementary
Service.
In addition
to those who hold a permanent position on the Road Board, there are some
employees who are considered alternates. When there is a need for Supplementary
Service, those holding a permanent position would be approached first. If for
some reason they choose to decline, efforts would be made to find someone else
amongst the alternates. However, the evidence indicated that if no alternate
was available, it would be expected that the man holding the permanent position
on the Road Board would take up the assignment (assuming no acceptable excuse
such as illness).
As a
general rule, employees are anxious for this Supplementary Service, since it
usually would involve some overtime component. As such, not only do these
assignments increase present wages, they may have some longer term value in
terms of pension entitlements.
Mr. Legare’s
normal shift would be from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. In this instance, the
Supplementary Service work lasted from 8:00 a.m. until 8:20 p.m.
On April
15, 1998, Mr. Legare did not participate in the Supplementary Service
assignment. As such, he was paid his regular wage from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00
p.m. Had he participated in the Supplementary Service assignment, he would have
received four hours and twenty minutes at prevailing overtime rates.
During the
course of Mr. Legare’s evidence, it became clear that he asserted that on the
day in question he had not been advised, in a timely manner, of the
Supplementary Service nor was he asked to join same. According to Mr. Legare he
later learned of the Supplementary Service assignment, at which time a Company
officer indicated that Mr. Legare had not been called upon, as it was assumed
he was not available owing to his work that day in connection with the Health
and Safety Committee.
The Railway
indicated that it was their understanding that Mr. Legare had been advised of
the Supplementary Service assignment and given the opportunity to serve on
same. The representative of the Railway expressed significant surprise at the
evidence given by Mr. Legare.
As a
procedural matter, the arbitrator indicated to the parties, that in the event
there was a material element of surprise, this could be addressed through an
adjournment, to allow the Railway to call evidence concerning the issue of
whether Mr. Legare had been advised in a timely manner of the Supplementary
Service assignment. Such adjournment would be granted, if it were determined on
a review of the background, that the Railway should be reasonably considered to
have been caught off guard by this evidence.
Ultimately,
the parties agreed that the arbitrator should not make any assumption as to
whether or not Mr. Legare was told of the Supplementary Service assignment in a
timely manner and thereby given the opportunity to participate in such
assignment. As such, the parties recognize the possibility, that if Mr. Legare’s
being told was considered material, the decision may reflect two different
determinations, which the parties themselves would resolve by a further review
of the actual facts, once the arbitration award is issued.
Prior to
this agreement being reached by the parties, there was considerable argument
and debate on whether the Company ought to have been surprised by this evidence
and consequently as to whether the Company was entitled to an adjournment. I
would be remiss if I did not compliment the parties on their achieving a mutual
resolution of the procedural issue. While arbitrations may be heated events,
occasioning significant stress between the parties, the preparedness and
willingness of both parties to achieve a realistic compromise on this
procedural issue speaks well of the relationship between the parties.
The Union
claims a violation of Rule 6 and Rule 44.2. Rule 6 is a somewhat complicated
Rule that deals with Supplementary Service. Supplementary Service is a class of
work which is required to meet a variety of problems with respect to locomotive
or freight cars, that may arise anywhere at any time. Quite obviously, there is
a need to have the capability and capacity to attend to railway equipment at
locations which may be some distance from the nearest mechanical repair
facility. In this instance, the work required in the Regina area was apparently
1 and /4 hours travelling time from the Moose Jaw facility.
As Mr.
Legare held a permanent position on the Road Board, he would have had a
priority entitlement to perform the Supplementary Service assignment and would,
as previously noted, have received pay for 4 hours and 20 minutes at the
prevailing overtime rate, consequent upon working such assignment.
Instead of
Mr. Legare performing the Supplementary Service assignment, an employee (G.
Stettner) who was on the Spare Board, was called to perform the Supplementary
Service assignment on April 15th, 1998.
The Union
asserts that Mr. Legare, following the completion of his shift at 4:00 p.m.,
should have had an opportunity to participate in the Supplementary Service
assignment, which would then have allowed him to earn the overtime pay. The
Union argues that the failure to allow Mr. Legare to complete the overtime, or
to pay him the equivalent, constitutes a violation of Rule 44.2 and Section 135
of The Canada Labour Code.
The portion
of Rule 44.2 which is relevant to this matter is to be found in Subsection (g).
This Subsection reads as follows:
(g) Time
spent by members of the Committee in the course of their duty shall be
considered as time worked and shall be paid in accordance with the terms of the
Collective Agreement. This shall include all time spent out of the plant on
health, safety and environmental matters.
It is clear
that Rule 44.2(g) is intended to ensure that an employee who spends time in
duties relating to the Committee shall have the time spent deemed to be time
worked. In the Arbitrator’s view, Rule 44.2(g) simply treats the time spent by
the member as if it were time worked and the member is paid accordingly. So for
example, if a member of the Committee were to spend (on a particular day) four
hours in the course of his duties as a member of the Committee, he would
receive four hours pay to the same extent as if he had spent the time working.
In such example, if the employee then returned to his regular duties for the
next four hours, he would receive, for the day in question, a total of eight
hours of pay as “time worked”.
Absent any
provision in the Collective Agreement to the contrary, it is quite possible
that time spent by members of the Committee in the course of their duties could
attract overtime pay. So for example, if an employee worked for four hours and
then his duties as a member of the Committee took six hours, he would be deemed
to have had time worked (on that particular day) of 10 hours. This would result
in an obligation on the part of the Company to pay overtime at the prevailing
rates.
As noted
earlier, the Union has referred, as well, to Section 135 of The Canada Labour Code. That Section
creates a legislative authority to essentially achieve two purposes:
1. To
mandate that Safety and Health Committee members are entitled to such time from
their work as is necessary to attend meetings or to carry out any of the other
functions of a member of the Committee; and,
2. To
confirm that any time spent while carrying out any of the functions of a member
of the Committee shall, for the purpose of calculating wages owing to that
member, be deemed to have been spent at work.
So far as
it relates to this grievance, the effect of Section 135 neither enhances nor
detracts from the impact of Rule 44.2(g). The focus of the relevant section of
The Canada Labour Code is (as is the
case under the Collective Agreement) to equate and deem time spent on Committee
matters as time spent at work.
In their
written submissions to the Arbitrator, each party has presented an argument
drawn from a different premise. The Union assumes that Mr. Legare was not given
the opportunity to participate in the Supplementary Service assignment as the
Company assumed he would was not available owing to his participation in the
Health and Safety Committee on the day in question. The Railway, on the other
hand, draws its position from the premise that Mr. Legare had the opportunity to
participate in the Supplementary Service assignment but made a conscious
decision not to be available by choosing instead to participate in the Health
& Safety Committee meeting.
Based on
the evidence and arguments presented and a review of the relevant sections of
the Collective Agreement, I have arrived at the following conclusions:
1. Mr.
Legare was entitled to be informed of the Supplementary Service assignment in a
timely manner, notwithstanding any scheduled meeting of the Health and Safety
Committee.
2. Upon
being so informed, Mr. Legare was entitled to elect to participate in the
Supplementary Service assignment or, alternatively, to decline the
Supplementary Service assignment and participate in the meeting of the Health
and Safety Committee.
3. The
Company has no entitlement to assume that Mr. Legare is unavailable simply
because of a scheduled meeting of the Health and Safety Committee. Rather, the
Railway has the obligation to inform Mr. Legare of the Supplementary Service
assignment regardless of any scheduled Health and Safety Committee meeting, to
the same extent as if no such meeting were scheduled on the day in question.
4. If
Mr. Legare is presented with the opportunity for the Supplementary Service
assignment, and if he declines same, it is entirely appropriate for the Railway
to utilize another employee to fill the necessary complement of men required
for the Supplementary Service assignment.
5. Once
having made the election to participate in the Health and Safety Committee
rather than participating in the Supplementary Service assignment, there is
nothing in Rule 6 which, in the view of the arbitrator accords the employee the
opportunity to reclaim (as a matter of right) a participation in the
Supplementary Service assignment. Consequently, there is no right to receive
overtime pay for a period during which the employee neither worked or is deemed
to have worked.
Having
stated the foregoing conclusion, the arbitrator wishes to make it abundantly
clear, that it was open to the parties to have arrived at terminology in
Article 44.2(g), which would have led to a different conclusion. So for
example, the parties could have created a clause reading as follows:
An
employee serving as a member of the Health and Safety Committee shall on any
day when he attends to such duties, receive wages equivalent to those wages
which he would have received had he not, on the day in question, been attending
to duties of the Committee.
A clause of
the foregoing character, would likely lead to a conclusion that the individual
member would be paid, not simply in relation to the “time spent” in attending
to Committee duties on the day in question, but rather by reference to all
wages which he might otherwise have earned. In its argument, the Union has
attempted to secure an interpretation of Rule 44.2(g) which would capture for
the employee, compensation for a period during which the employee neither
worked nor is deemed to have worked. Rule 44.2(g) simply does not, in the
arbitrator’s view, allow for such interpretation. Whether or not Rule 44.2(g)
as currently written is sufficiently fair to those who serve as members of the
Health and Safety Committee is not the issue. The arbitrator must respect the
bargain struck by the parties and not engage in rewriting the Collective
Agreement under the guise of interpretation. Earlier in this award, I refer to
the agreement made by the parties concerning the fact that the arbitrator not
make any assumption as to whether or not Mr. Legare was told of the
Supplementary Service assignment in a timely manner and thereby given an
opportunity to participate in such assignment. The arbitrator was requested
therefore to make a ruling which would take into account either factual
possibility. Having regard to all of the evidence and argument tendered and
having regard to the conclusions and comments hereinbefore set out, the
arbitrator makes the following determination:
1. If
on April l5th, 1998 Mr. Legare was not informed in a timely manner of the
Supplementary Service assignment and thereby given the opportunity to
participate in such assignment, such failure would constitute a breach of the
Collective Agreement and consequently Mr. Legare would be entitled to a payment
of 4 hours and 20 minutes at prevailing overtime rates.
2. Alternatively,
if on April 15th, 1998 Mr. Legare was informed of the Supplementary Service
assignment in a timely manner and thereby given the opportunity to participate
in such assignment, but he declined same and chose instead to participate in
the Health and Safety Committee on the day in question, Mr. Legare would not be
entitled to receive any overtime compensation.
In the
normal course, a grievance is either allowed or dismissed through the
arbitration process. In this instance, that degree of finality cannot be achieved
since a crucial factual matter has been left to be discussed by the parties
following the issuance of this award. It is possible that the parties will come
to an agreement on that factual aspect. Alternatively, the parties may find
themselves incapable of achieving a common ground on the crucial factual issue
of whether or not Mr. Legare was informed in a timely manner of the
Supplementary Service assignment and consequently whether he was afforded the
opportunity to participate in such assignment. Accordingly, the arbitrator
retains jurisdiction to reconvene the hearing, at the request of either party
hereto, in the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement on the
factual issue, so that the factual issue may be dealt with and the grievance
disposed of with finality.
In the
event of such request, the evidence and argument presented should be restricted
to matters directly related to whether or not Mr. Legare was informed in a
timely manner of the Supplementary Service assignment and thereby afforded the
opportunity to participate in such assignment. It is not contemplated by the
arbitrator that any reconvening of the hearing be utilized, by either party, as
an opportunity to reopen the matter in its entirety.
Additional
to the foregoing, the arbitrator retains jurisdiction in the event of any
dispute between the parties with respect to the interpretation or
implementation of this award.
In closing,
I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to both parties for the
clarity and skill with which they presented their respective arguments and
positions.
AT DATED
WINNIPEG in Manitoba this 25 day of November 1999.
(signed)
SIDNEY G. SORONOW
ARBITRATOR